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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

MODERN UNILATERAL CONTRACTSt
MARK PETrIT, JR.*

Why would anyone write about unilateral contracts today? After all, Karl
Llewellyn argued convincingly more than forty years ago' that unilateral
contracts are rare and unimportant and should be relegated to the "freak
tent. ' 2 Academics, he said, created the "Great Dichotomy" between unilateral and bilateral contracts; lack of support for the unilateral contract idea
in the cases required those academics to illustrate the concept with ridicul-

ous hypotheticals about climbing greased flagpoles and crossing the Brooklyn Bridge. The drafters of the Second Restatement of Contracts thus
considered it a step forward when they not only minimized the importance of
the unilateral-bilateral distinction but sought to eliminate the term "unilateral contract" from the lexicon of the law. Today, those commentators who
still deem the subject worthy of mention applaud the burial of the unilateral
contract.3 Why unearth the decaying corpse?
This Article suggests that in fact unilateral contract never died, but is alive
and thriving as never before. An examination of American cases, decided
since the first tentative draft of the Second Restatement was published in
t © 1983 by Mark Pettit, Jr.
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. A.B., 1968, Bowdoin
College; J.D., 1971, University of Chicago.
I want to thank the many colleagues who provided helpful comments on early
drafts. I owe particular thanks to Ronald Cass, Burnett Harvey, John Leubsdorf, and
Aviam Soifer, each of whom labored through more than one draft, and to my
research assistants-Cindy Hirsch, Robert Landau, John Riley, and Joseph Whalen.
See Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract:Offer and Acceptance (pts. I &
2), 48 YALE L.J. 1, 779 (1938-1939).
2 Id. at 36.
3 See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 92-96 (2d ed.
1977); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 290-92 (2d

ed. 1970); Mooney, Old Kontract Principlesand Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 234-35, 258
(1966); Murray, Contracts: A New Design.for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL
L. REV. 785, 785-86, 802, 805-06 (1968); Comment, UnilateralContracts:An Examination ofTraditionalConcepts and the ProposedSolution of the ALl Restatement of
Contracts, Second (Tentative Draft No. 1), 5 DUQ. U.L. REV. 175, 187-89 (19661967); Note, Acceptance by Performance When the Offeror Demands a Promise, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 1917, 1926-31 (1979).
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1964, 4 reveals not only that lawyers and judges continue to employ unilateral

contract analysis in traditional areas, but that they find the concept useful for
expanding contractual analysis into new areas. Of particular importance is
the use of unilateral contract to establish one-way obligations of such institutions as employers, governments, and schools toward individuals with
whom they deal. Unilateral contract has become an important concept in
defining relationships that arise in our increasingly organized society. Despite the efforts of Llewellyn and the drafters of the Second Restatement
unilateral contracts are overcrowding the freak tent and spilling over into the
Big Top.
According to traditional doctrine, contracts-whether unilateral or
bilateral-generally are initiated when one party (the offeror) makes a promise (the offer). The distinguishing feature of the unilateral contract is that
the second party (the offeree) has not made a promise in return. Llewellyn
found implied promises by offerees, not in order to allow offerors to enforce
those implied promises but rather to bind offerors to their offers. Modern
courts share Llewellyn's goal of binding the original promisor, but feel more
free to do so without inferring a return promise.
Eliminating the need to find return promises has made it easier to expand
contractual analysis into new areas to increase the scope of civil obligation.
Given this development, the crucial question shifts from whether the offeree
made a return promise to whether the offeror made any promise in the first
place. In other words, the increased use of unilateral contract ultimately
raises questions about the appropriate limits of contractual analysisquestions that require an exploration of the sources of contractual obligation.
I.

THE UNILATERAL-BILATERAL DISTINCTION AND CRITICISM OF THE

"GREAT

DICHOTOMY"

The first Restatement of Contracts divided contracts into two mutually
exclusive groups:
A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as
consideration for his promise. A bilateral contract is one in which there
are mutual promises between two parties to the contract; each party
being both a promisor and a promisee.'
4

The first tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Contracts included

Chapter 1, "Meaning of Terms," Chapter 2, "Formation of Contracts-Parties and
Capacity," and Chapter 3, "Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent." Most of the
sections relevant to the unilateral-bilateral distinction appear in Chapters 1 and 3.

These chapters have not been substantially changed from the 1964 version.
I RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932). Apparently there are some contracts
that do not fall into either category. IfA promises B in consideration ofB's promise to
C, the promises are not mutual and therefore do not fit the definition of a bilateral
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In simpler (and less precise) terms, a unilateral contract results from an
exchange of a promise for an act; a bilateral contract results from an
6
exchange of promises.
Williston claimed that the "vital distinction" between unilateral and bilateral contracts "was fully recognized three hundred years ago, but lack of
appropriate names caused the distinction and its consequences to be frequently overlooked in the later history of the law." 7 Williston found the first
use of the terms "unilateral" and "bilateral," in the sense in which he
defined those terms, in a few judicial opinions in the mid-nineteenth century.
But he credited Christopher Columbus Langdell, that famous discoverer of
legal doctrine at Harvard in the latter part of the nineteenth century," with
popularizing unilateral-bilateral terminology. 9
Corbin suggested that the primary reason for drawing the distinction
between unilateral and bilateral contracts is to prevent the errors caused by
misapplication of the concept of "mutuality of obligation."' 0 It has sometimes been asserted that not only are two parties necessary to produce a
contract but that both must become obligated-that "both parties must be
2
bound or neither is bound.""II As both Williston and Corbin pointed out,'
this ill-considered attempt at generalization fails to take account of unilateral
contracts, which, by definition, are formed without any promise by the
offeree to do anything. Courts that failed to understand the distinction,
according to Corbin, refused to enforce unilateral contracts that should have
been enforced. Since Williston was the Reporter and principal draftsman of
the first Restatement, and since Corbin was his Special Adviser and principal assistant, it is not surprising that the first Restatement gave primacy to
the unilateral-bilateral distinction.
In the late 1930's Karl Llewellyn vigorously attacked the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts.' 3 He argued that the "Great Dicontract. Since B is a "promisor" who "receives a promise as consideration for his
promise," the contract is not unilateral either. These cases "are properly kept
separate." Id. comment e.
6 For explanations of why the first Restatement did not adopt this popular terminology, see Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515, 516 n.11 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Stoljar, The False
Distinction (citing Stotjar, The Ambiguity of Promise, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 2-5
(1952)). See also I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 21, at 56 (1963); Murray, supra note 3,
at 802 n.45.
7 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13, at 18, 19 & n.3
(rev. ed. 1936).
8 See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5-6, 97-98 (1974).

9 See I S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, at 19 n.3.
10 See I A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 21, at 52-53, 59.
"1 Id. at 53 n.60.
12 See id.; I S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 13, at 19-20.
'3 See Llewellyn, supra note 1.
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chotomy" of unilaterals and bilaterals "misfits" real life situations and
therefore misfits the cases. 14 The notion that an offeree must accept an offer
either by making a return promise or by performing an act, depending on
which of these two methods the offeror desires, reflects confusion about
what happens in real life and spawns analytic difficulties. ' 5 Even worse, the
unilateral-bilateral distinction can lead to unjust results in particular cases. If
a court determines that an offer calls for acceptance by performance, the
traditional rule that the offeror can revoke his offer at any time before
acceptance' 6 means that he can revoke up until the time that the offeree
completes performance. If the offeree cannot perform the desired act instantaneously, he remains unprotected from the offeror's revocation while he is
expending effort and expense in carrying out his performance. To Llewellyn,
a doctrine that could produce this result was not only "unjust and inequitable"; it was also "so improbable as to scandalize good sense."' 7
The drafters of the first Restatement attempted to deal with this revocation problem in Section 45, which provided that if the offeror made an offer
for a unilateral contract, a giving or tender of part performance by the
offeree bound the offeror to the contract.' 8 Llewellyn believed that, although Section 45 was an important step in mitigating the harsh effects of
unilateral contract analysis, the analysis itself was faulty and had to be
changed.
Llewellyn asked why a concept as nonsensical as the traditional theory of
the unilateral contract managed to persist. He explained that the traditional
analysis gained support from the fact that it seemed to cause relatively little
trouble in two types of cases. The first type involved what Llewellyn called
the "pseudo-unilateral," an agreement-based deal in which the offeree's
performance could be accomplished "substantially at one stroke." 1 9 When
the offeree performed without first promising to perform, judges simply said

See id. at 31-32, 779-80.
is Id. at 36, 787-89.
The simple act of asserting the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy suggests that the
distinction is important-a suggestion which Llewellyn rejected.
To be sure, no line of analysis can properly be said to be wrong, merely because
it divides mankind, say, into such a dichotomy as those who are bearded ladies
and those who are not. But such a line of analysis does suggest the presence of
more bearded ladies than there are, which tends to mislead.
Id. at 36.
16 See, e.g., I S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 55; 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 38;
14

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 35()(e) (1932).

Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 805 (emphasis in original).
18 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). Although the offeror is "bound by a
contract," his duty of performance "is conditional on the full consideration being
given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein,
within a reasonable time." Id.
19 Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 805-06.
17
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that his performance constituted the necessary acceptance. Contracts of this
type are not truly classical unilaterals according to Llewellyn because they
involve offers that can be accepted by return promises.
Llewellyn's second type-the "classical" or "true" unilateral case ° involved "the offer for a speculative prize," the offer of a reward or a
broker's commission or the like. Llewellyn argued that true unilateral contracts are rare. What is unusual about them is that neither words nor actions
by the offeree provide any assurance of success to the offeror by "moving
with business certainty toward the performance." '2' In addition, the consideration promised for success often greatly exceeds the per diem value of the
offeree's services. The offeree is in effect competing for a prize; he is
gambling with his time and effort in hopes of hitting the jackpot. 2 Llewellyn
concluded that it is only in these rare "prize" cases that a return promise by
the offeree would not bind the offeror. In the overwhelming majority of
cases, the offeror does not care whether he receives a return promise or
some action moving toward performance-all he wants is to know whether
' 23
"the deal is on.
An Australian scholar, Samuel Stoljar, launched another assault on the
unilateral-bilateral distinction in 1955.24 Stoljar argued that the unilateralbilateral distinction incorporates a logical error in the conception of the
nature of contract formation. 25 Applying the analysis of the famous Fuller
and Perdue article, 26 he suggested that the proper approach recognizes the
hierarchy of interests-restitution, reliance, and expectation, in that descending order-and determines whether a bargain is "set afoot" by looking
for the presence of these interests. 27 The traditional theory of the unilateral
contract is incoherent, he argued, because it protects the expectation interest while ignoring the more basic and important reliance interest. 28 Again,
20

Id. at 806.

21

Id.

Id.
Id. at 788, 790, 807.
24 See Stoljar, The False Distinction, supra note 6.
25 See id. at 516 & n.6.
26 Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937).
27 See Stoljar, The False Distinction, supra note 6, at 517-18, 519.
21 See id. at 534. Like Llewellyn, Stoljar was not satisfied with the "curious
provision" in Section 45 of the first Restatement that "the promisee may accept the
unilateral contract by part performance." See id. at 535, 527 n.53. Stoljar believed
that Section 45 was merely an attempt to avoid some of the harsh results of the
unilateral-bilateral distinction without confronting the illogic of the distinction itself
and its failure to recognize the importance of the reliance interest. See id. at 527 n.53.
But Stoljar did not consider whether reliance should be the appropriate measure of
recovery. He argued only that reliance by the promisee is a stronger reason than the
promisee's return promise for enforcing the original promise. See id. at 522-24.
22
23
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allowing revocation before complete performance in the unilateral contract
situation creates the practical problem. An offeree who acts in reasonable
reliance on another's promise should be protected.
Both Llewellyn and Stoljar attacked the unilateral-bilateral distinction on
broad, doctrinal grounds, but both were concerned primarily with the revocation problem. Both argued for greater enforceability of promises. They
believed that minimizing or eliminating the concept of the unilateral contract
would be an important step toward preventing unjustified evasions of promissory liability. Although their arguments were convincing and appropriate
in the limited context of the revocation problem, neither scholar could
foresee the modern uses of the unilateral contract.
II.

THE SECOND RESTATEMENT

Chapter 3 of the Second Restatement, "Formation of Contracts-Mutual
Assent," reveals the unmistakable influence of Karl Llewellyn.2 9 The Second Restatement omits all references to "unilateral" and "bilateral" contracts. A Reporter's Note to Section 1 explains: "Section 12 of the Original
Restatement defined unilateral and bilateral contracts. It has not been carried forward because of doubt as to the utility of the distinction, often treated
as fundamental, between the two types." ' 30 But the Second Restatement
continues to distinguish between acceptance by performance and acceptance by promise. 3 Although this simple substitution of labels might not
appear to be significant, it is possible that merely substituting descriptive
terminology for a non-descriptive (or perhaps misdescriptive) label might
32
influence substantive results.
The changes effected in the Second Restatement purport to go beyond
changes in terminology, however. 3 3 Section 31 of the first Restatement
provided that in case of doubt an offer is presumed to invite the formation of
29 See Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J.
302, 303-04, 306-07 (1964). The late Professor and Justice Braucher was the Reporter
for the early (pre-1971) tentative drafts of the Second Restatement.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1, Reporter's Note, comment f
(1981). The Reporter's Note also suggests that the term "unilateral contract" produced confusion because under the original Restatement the definition included three
different types of transactions: 1) promises not contemplating a bargain, 2) certain
option contracts, and 3) bargains completed on one side. See id.
3'See id. § 50.
32 See Braucher, supra note 29, at 303, for an appropriate remark made in commenting generally on the innovations in the first tentative draft of the Second
Restatement: "But it should not be surprising that a stylistic revision may be
symptomatic of fundamental shifts in modes of thought."
33For discussions of the differences between the first and second Restatements on
the subject of contract formation, see Braucher, supra note 29; Murray, supra note 3;
Comment, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3; Note, The Restatement of Contracts

Second and Offers to Enter into Unilateral Contracts, 29 U.

(1968).

PITT.
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a bilateral contract. Section 32 of the Second Restatement states a new
principle: "In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to
accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses." 34 Section 62 of the Second
Restatement provides that where an offer invites the offeree to choose
between acceptance by promise and acceptance by performance (presumptively the usual case under Section 32) the tender, beginning, or tender of a
beginning of the invited performance constitutes an acceptance by performance that operates as a promise to render complete performance. In other
words, the mere tender or beginning of performance is an acceptance that
35
binds the offeror and also the offeree.
The combined effect of Sections 32 and 62 apparently makes it unnecessary to distinguish in the great majority of cases between offers calling for
performance and offers calling for return promise. Either performance or
promise will suffice as an acceptance, binding both parties. The Second
Restatement still allows an offeror to require that acceptance be by perform34 Comment a to Section 32 indicates that this section is a "particular application
of the rule stated in § 30(2)." Section 30(2) provides: "Unless otherwise indicated by
the language or the circumstances, an offer invites acceptance in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances." These sections reflect Llewellyn's
strong belief, evident also in Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code, that
most offerors do not call for acceptance either by performance only or by promise
only, but rather are indifferent to the mode of acceptance. See Llewellyn, supra note
1, at 809. Llewellyn pointed out that Whittier expressed the same idea years earlier.
See id. (citing Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CALIF.
L. REV. 441, 453 (1929)). For a discussion of the difference in language between
Section 30(2) of the Second Restatement [Section 29(2) of the first tentative drafti
and Section 2-206(l)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code, see Murray, supra note 3,
at 793-95.
3- Section 62 states in unqualified terms the rule binding the offeree who chooses
to accept by beginning performance. Nevertheless, comment c to Section 62 states
unequivocally that the rule binding the offeree "yields to a manifestation of contrary
intention under § 53(2).," See Braucher, supra note 29, at 307. Section 53(2), however, says only that the offeree can notify the offeror that the offeree's rendering of a
performance does not constitute an acceptance at all. It does not explicitly state that
the offeree who begins performance can bind the offeror without binding himself by
expressing his intention to do so. In any event, Section 53(2) requires the offeree "to
notify" the offeror of his intention; it does not explicitly permit the court to find a
"contrary intention" absent some reasonable notice to the offeror. Various other
comments in the Second Restatement suggest that the offeree might not be bound in
all Section 62 cases, but these comments simply refer the reader back to Section 62 or

make no reference to any section. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

18

comment b; § 32 comments a & b; § 50 comment b & illustration 2; § 62 comment b
(1981). The result of all this is that an offeree who responds to a "doubtful offer" (an
offer that does not clearly specify that acceptance can be made only by performance)
by beginning performance will find it difficult under the Second Restatement to argue
that he is not liable to the offeror if he fails to complete his performance.
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ance only. In such a case, Section 45, rather than Section 62, applies. It
should be emphasized, however, that the drafters intended that Section 45
apply only to a small minority of cases; they believed that only rarely do
offerors intend to limit the mode of acceptance to performance.

36

Even if

Section 45 does apply, it uses the same terminology as Section 62 (tender,
beginning, or tender of a beginning of performance) to describe what action
by the offeree is necessary to bind the offeror.3 7 The primary concern of
those who criticized the unilateral-bilateral distinction was the problem of
offerors revoking their offers after part performance by offerees. The Second Restatement provides identical protection to offerees who begin or
tender performance regardless of whether a promise is a permissible mode of
acceptance. The difference between Section 45 and Section 62 is that under
Section 45 the offeree is not bound to complete the performance he has
tendered or begun, as he is under Section 62.
A Restatement reflects-in unspecified proportion-the drafters' views of
what judges have done and what they should do. 38 The Second Restatement
seems to say that judges who have not done so already should: 1) cease
employing the terms "unilateral contract" and "bilateral contract"; 2) recognize that the one-sided-promise transaction is a rare species, and 3)
hesitate to proclaim the discovery of one of these rarities. Like the amateur
birder, they should resolve all doubts in favor of the more common variety.
III.

THE PROLIFERATION OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTS CASES

If you ask a law student (or law teacher, for that matter) to give an
example of a unilateral contract, you are quite likely to hear an interesting
story about tracking down an alleged criminal or purchasing a smoke ball to

The drafters state in two places that the typical illustrations of offers that can be
accepted only by performance are offers of rewards or prizes and offers made in
non-commercial arrangements among relatives and friends. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 32 comment b; § 45 comment a (1981); see also id. § 1,
Reporter's Note, comment f: "Finally, the effect of the [unilateral-bilateral] distinc36

tion has been to exaggerate the importance of the type of bargain in which one party
begins performance without making any commitment, as in the classic classroom
case of the promise to pay a reward for climbing a flagpole."
37 Section 45 provides that where an offer invites acceptance by performance only,
the tender, beginning, or tender of a beginning of the invited performance creates an
"option contract." Section 25 defines "option contract" as "a promise which meets
the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to

revoke an offer."
3 See generally H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

748-71 (tent. ed. 1958); Casner, Re-

statement (Second) of Property as an Instrument of Law Reform, 67
87 (1981).

IOWA
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ward off influenza. 39 These stories involve disputed claims for rewards or
prizes, and serve in casebooks as memorable illustrations of unilateral contract analysis. 40 More common, but less dramatic, traditional unilateral
contracts cases involve broker commissions, options to purchase or lease,
loans and guaranties, insurance, and releases. It is probably not surprising
that the Second Restatement has not eliminated the use of unilateralbilateral analysis in any of these traditional areas. 4' But the concept of the
unilateral contract is not merely holding its own; lawyers and judges are
using the idea in an increasing number and variety of modern contexts.
A.

UnilateralContracts Between Employers and Employees

The most notable expansion of unilateral contract analysis has occurred in
disputes between employers and employees. 42 Cases arising from the
39 See, e.g., Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke
Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
40 Other favorite cases, used in the current casebooks to illustrate the unilateralbilateral distinction, involve offers that say in effect: "You take care of me now, and
I'll take care of you in my will." See Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026
(1934); Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917). Recent cases of this
type include: Sommerville v. Epps, 36 Conn. Sup. 323, 419 A.2d 909 (1980);
McCandlish v. Estate of Timberlake, 497 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
These cases may soon be replaced by some of the "nonmarital cohabitation"
cases. The most famous of these cases, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), involved an alleged exchange of promises. Although
judges apparently have not yet employed explicit unilateral contract terminology in
these cases, whenever one party provides services and the other party promises to
pay for those services in the future, courts could invoke unilateral contract analysis.
The promise might be: "You take care of me now, and I'll take care of you when I
acquire fortune and fame." See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d
902 (1979); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
41 See, e.g., broker cases: Real Estate Listing Serv., Inc. v. Connecticut Real
Estate Comm'n, 179 Conn. 128, 425 A.2d 581 (1979); Dixon v. Betten, 2 I11.App. 3d
708, 277 N.E.2d 355 (1971); Judd Realty, Inc. v. Tedesco, 400 A.2d 952 (R.I. 1979);
options cases: Aerojet-General Corp. v. Kirk, 318 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 819 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); Palo Alto Town &
Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Co., 11 Cal. 3d 494, 521 P.2d 1097, 113 Cal. Rptr. 705
(1974); Erich v. Granoff, 109 Cal. App. 3d 920, 167 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1980); loans and
guaranties: Hills v. Gardiner Sav. Inst., 309 A.2d 877 (Me. 1973); Knight v. Seattle
First Nat'l Bank, 22 Wash. App. 493, 589 P.2d 1279 (1979); insurance: Warren v.
Confederation Life Ass'n, 401 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1968); Rittenhouse Found., Inc. v.
Lloyds of London, 443 Pa. 161, 277 A.2d 785 (1971); releases: Coffman Indus., Inc.
v. Gorman-Taber Co., 521 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Brown v. Hammermill
Paper Co., 88 Wis. 2d 224, 276 N.W.2d 709 (1979).
42 Judicial use of unilateral contract analysis in employment cases is not new. See,
e.g., Henderson Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App. 337, 85 So. 35 (1920);
Orton & Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App. 462, 129 N.E. 47 (1920);
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employer-employee relationship now comprise the largest and most important group of cases in which courts invoke the concept of the unilateral
contract. Cases involving unilateral contract analysis of claims for broker
commissions, which earlier commentators found to be the most common
unilateral contracts cases, 43 are still important, but now appear less frequently in the reports than do the employment cases.
The typical cases involve claims by employees against present or former
employers for employment benefits of one kind or another. Employees may
assert rights to pension benefits,

44

bonus or incentive payments,

45

profit

Wellington v. Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W. 396 (1925);
Roberts v. Mays Mills, Inc., 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530 (1922); Wallace v. Northern
Ohio Traction & Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 13 N.E.2d 139 (1937); Scholl v.
Hershey Chocolate Co., 71 Pa. Super. 244 (1919); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co., 125
Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923); Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W.
769 (1912). More recently, however, these cases have proliferated. See, e.g., cases
cited infra notes 44-49.
43 Navin, Some Comments on Unilateral Contracts and Restatement 90, 46
MARQ. L. REV. 162, 166 (1962) ("Real estate brokerage contracts make up a sizeable

portion of the total number of cases [in which the courts have consciously applied the
theory of unilateral contract]."); see Stoljar, The False Distinction, supra note 6, at
525; Note, supra note 33, at 556-57. Even as recently as 1982, a leading commentator
writes: "The major area for the practical application of § 45 has been the real estate
brokerage transaction." E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 181 (1982).
14 There have been more than fifty retirement-benefit cases reported since 1964 in
which unilateral contract analysis has been used either explicitly or implicitly. See,
e.g., Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

913 (1979); Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Marvel v. Dannemann,
490 F. Supp. 170 (D. Del. 1980); Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Fries v.
United Mine Workers, 30 Ill. App. 3d 575, 333 N.E.2d 600 (1975); Harvey v. National
Bank of Commerce, 504 P.2d 424 (Okla. 1972); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of
Portland, 271 Or. 588, 533 P.2d 339 (1975); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19
Utah 2d 297, 431 P.2d 130 (1967); Jacoby v. Gray's Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77
Wash. 2d 911, 468 P.2d 666 (1970).
4s There have been more than twenty employee-bonus or incentive cases reported
since 1964 in which unilateral contract analysis has been used either explicitly or
implicitly. See, e.g., Stone v. Moore, 375 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1967); Leone v.
Precision Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 121 Ariz. 514, 591 P.2d 1002 (1979); Sigrist v.
Century 21 Corp., 519 P.2d 362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Gustafson v. Lindquist, 40 111.
App. 3d 152, 351 N.E.2d 280 (1976); North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 275 Or. 359,
551 P.2d 431 (1976); Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327, 509 P.2d 439
(1973); Thompson v. Burr., 260 Or. 329, 490 P.2d 157 (1971); Peloquin v. Arden
Eng'g Co., 104 R.I. 671, 248 A.2d 316 (1968); Toch v. Eric Schuster Corp., 490
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Thatcher v. Wasatch Chem. Co., 29 Utah 2d 189,
507 P.2d 365 (1973).
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sharing benefits, 4 6 severance pay, 47 or other benefits. 48 A few cases involve

employee challenges to terminations. 49 Not all courts invoke the theory of
the unilateral contract in these cases, of course. Judges often decide these
disputes without inquiry into questions of contract formation; frequently,
they make no effort to explain the contracting process or even to use
contract terminology. 50 In such instances, lawyers, judges, and indexers do
46

See, e.g., Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977);

Couch v. Administrative Comm. of Difco Labs., Inc. Salaried Employees Profit
Sharing Trust, 44 Mich. App. 44, 205 N.W.2d 24 (1972); Russell v. Princeton Labs.,
Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 231 A.2d 800 (1967); Evo v. Jomac, Inc., 119 N.J. Super. 7,289 A.2d
551 (1972); Novack v. Bilnor Corp., 26 A.D.2d 572, 271 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1966);
Schlaifer v. Kaiser, 84 Misc. 2d 817, 377 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d
749, 378 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1975); Graham v. Hudgins, Thomson, Ball & Assocs., Inc.,
540 P.2d 1161 (Okla. 1975); Garner v. Girard Trust Bank, 442 Pa. 166, 275 A.2d 359
(1971); Levitt v. Billy Penn Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 499, 283 A.2d 873 (1971); Simmons
v. Hitt, 546 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
41 See, e.g., Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Chapin
v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192, 107 Cal. Rptr. Ill
(1973); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976); Cain v. Allen
Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956); Gaydos v. White Motor

Co., 54 Mich. App. 143, 220 N.W.2d 697 (1974); Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48
Mich. App. 667, 211 N.W.2d 101 (1973); Dangott v. ASG Indus., Inc., 558 P.2d 379
(Okla. 1976); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
48 See, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1972)
(compensation for suggestion); Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102
(D.S.D. 1977) (commissions), aff'd, 583 F.2d 1007 (1978); Harrison v. Jack Eckerd
Corp., 342 F. Supp. 348 (M.D. Fla.) (stock options), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1972); Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (death
benefits); Newberger v. Rifkind, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1973)
(stock options); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (stock options);
Carlini v. United States Rubber Co., 8 Mich. App. 501, 154 N.W.2d 595 (1967)
(compensation for suggestion); Melin v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 266 N.W.2d 183
(Minn. 1978) (disability benefits); Ehrle v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of America,
530 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (disability benefits); McHorse v. Portland
General Elec. Co., 268 Or. 323, 521 P.2d 315 (1974) (disability benefits); State v.
Oregon State Motor Ass'n, 248 Or. 133, 432 P.2d 512 (1967) (vacation pay); Harryman v. Roseburg Rural Fire Protection Dist., 244 Or. 631, 420 P.2d 51 (1966) (sick
leave allowance); Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 259 A.2d 443
(1969) (compensation for suggestion).
49 See, e.g., NLRB v. Colonial Press, Inc., 509 F.2d 850 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 833 (1975); Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd, 627

F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980); Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150
Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978); Seco Chems., Inc. v. Stewart, 169 Ind. App. 624, 349 N.E.2d
733 (1976); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980); Garrett v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
50 See, e.g., Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 444 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1971);
Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512,446 P.2d 634 (1968); Allen v. Crowell-
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not treat these cases as "contract" cases at all, but rather as "employment"
or "pension rights" cases, for example. With the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 51 judges sometimes can dispose of certain benefit claims simply by construing particular
ERISA provisions, 52 although ERISA does not require employers to establish benefit plans, and thus does not displace contract law as the initial
source of employee rights. A few courts find return promises by employees
and use bilateral contract analysis.5 3 Nevertheless, judicial use of unilateral
contract analysis in employment cases has become so widespread that it
warrants a search for explanations.
1. Cases in Which the Employee Has Fully Performed
Some courts use the term "unilateral contract" to describe a relationship
in which an offeree has fully (or at least substantially) rendered the performance sought by the offeror. The contract is unilateral in the sense that only
one party has any remaining obligation, as well as unilateral in the sense that
the offeror did not receive a promise in return for his promise. Many of the
employment cases that use the term "unilateral contract" are of this type;
the employee who has fully or substantially performed sues the employer to
recover promised benefits. 5 4 For example, in Harvey v. National Bank of
Commerce, 55 a former employee sued his employer to recover pension
benefits after his pension was discontinued. Harvey alleged that his employer had promised that, if Harvey took early retirement, he would receive
a pension for life. Harvey did retire early, although it was made clear to him
that he had no obligation to do so. In affirming a directed verdict for Harvey,
Collier Publishing Co., 26 A.D.2d 516, 270 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1966), rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d
403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968); Friedman v. Romaine, 77 Misc. 2d
134, 352 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct., Spec. T. 1974).
sI 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
52 See, e.g., Thomas v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Calhoun v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F.
Supp. 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
53 See, e.g., Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1968); Pauley v. Industrial
Comm'n, 109 Ariz. 298, 508 P.2d 1160 (1973); Knack v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 Ariz.
545, 503 P.2d 373 (1972); City Prods. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 286,
506 P.2d 1071 (1973); Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971);
Vondras v. Titanium Research & Dev. Co., 511 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
14 See, e.g., Bonar v. Barnett Bank, 488 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Fontecchio v. United Steelworkers, 476 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1979); Denzer v. Purofied
Down Prods. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Genevese v,Martin-Marietta
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Seco Chems., Inc. v. Stewart, 169 Ind.
App. 624, 349 N.E.2d 733 (1976); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d
221 (1976); Harvey v. National Bank of Commerce, 504 P.2d 424 (Okla. 1972);
Thompson v. Burr, 260 Or. 329, 490 P.2d 157 (1971).
ss504 P.2d 424 (Okla. 1972).
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the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that his early retirement amounted to
an acceptance of the employer's offer and created a valid unilateral con56
tract.
Cases such as Harvey do not seem to present any serious doctrinal
problems. They often turn on whether the court finds that the employee did
in fact substantially meet his performance obligations. Employers may argue
that, even if the employee has substantially performed, they have no legal
obligation to make the benefit payments. Courts in earlier times sometimes
characterized certain employment benefits as "mere gratuities" in order to
reject claims of contractual rights to them by employees.5 7 This view runs8
counter to contemporary conceptions of the employment relationship,
however, and has generally been discarded.5 9 Most modern courts characterize employment benefits as forms of compensation (usually deferred
60
compensation) that employees earn just as they earn wages or salaries.
Id. at 427.
See, e.g., Judd v. Wasie, 211 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1954); Russell v. Johns-Manville
Co., 53 Cal. App. 572, 200 P. 668 (1921); Arrow Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 141 Colo. 1, 346
P.2d 305 (1959); Fontius Shoe Co. v. Lamberton, 78 Colo. 250, 241 P. 542 (1925);
Johnson v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 Md. 31, 28 A.2d 606 (1942); Burgess v.
First Nat'l Bank, 219 A.D. 361, 220 N.Y.S. 134 (1927); Friedle v. First Nat'l Bank,
129 Misc. 309, 221 N.Y.S. 292 (N.Y. City Ct. 1927). See generally Note, Contractual
56

17

Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 255 n.23, 263 n.58
(1956).
58 See generally M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY

(1981). Glendon argues that as legal ties among family members have weakened, the
law has played a greater role in cementing the relationship between employer and
employee. In the modern employment relationship, legal rights are more quickly
recognized and less easily terminated. See Clark, Book Review, 16 FAM. L.Q. 93
(1982).
59 See Note, supra note 57, at 266-68.
60 See, e.g., Audio Fidelity Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 624 F.2d 513,
518 (4th Cir. 1980); Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1975) (no
recovery allowed because rights had not vested); Matthews v. Swift & Co., 465 F.2d
814, 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.
1971); Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192, 198, 107
Cal. Rptr. 111, 116 (1973); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del.
1969); Winkler v. Frank-Cunningham Stores Corp., 256 A.2d 905, 907 (D.C. 1969);
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 335, 563 P.2d 54, 59 (1977); Morse
v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353, 1357 (La. 1977); Crinnion v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 156 N.J. Super. 479, 483, 384 A.2d 159, 161 (1978);
Schlaifer v. Kaiser, 84 Misc. 2d 817, 821, 377 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50
A.D.2d 749, 378 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1975); Dangott v. ASG Indus., Inc., 558 P.2d 379, 382
(Okla. 1976) (alternative ground); Levitt v. Billy Penn Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 499, 503,
283 A.2d 873, 875 (1971); Simmons v. Hitt, 546 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976); Weaver v. Evans, 80 Wash. 2d 461, 475, 495 P.2d 639, 648 (1972); Jacoby v.
Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 911, 915, 468 P.2d 666, 669 (1970);
Frank v. Day's, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 401, 404, 535 P.2d 479, 481-82 (1975).
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When courts use the term "unilateral contract" in these "half-executed"
cases, 6' they are only describing what happened-the employee completed
performance without promising to perform. They are not using the term to
suggest that the employee could not have accepted by making a return
promise. There is simply no need to address the issue of whether a promise
would have been a permissible mode of acceptance. Although the courts do
not invoke the unilateral contract idea in these cases to indicate that full
performance is the only permissible mode of acceptance, they do employ it
in reaching the conclusion that it is a permissible mode of acceptance.
Llewellyn was right when he argued that courts do not need the concept of
the unilateral contract to reach this non-controversial result. When an employee completes the performance sought by the employer, it would be
strange indeed to allow the employer to avoid liability on the grounds that
62
the employee made no promise and thus had no obligation to perform.
These cases present the strongest case for enforcement of the employer's
promise because they are based on benefits actually conferred on the prom63
isor by the promisee by reason of the promise.
2.

Cases in Which the Employee Has Partially Performed

Attempts by employers to revoke or amend benefit offers after employees
only partially perform present more difficult problems. An example may help
to illustrate how and why courts use the concept of the unilateral contract in
these incomplete-performance cases. In Sylvestre v. State, 6 4 six retired
61 Lon Fuller used the term "half-completed."
Fuller, Consideration and Form,
41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941); see also Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and
Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743 (1982).

Section 63 of the first Restatement provided that, even if the offeror requested
acceptance by promise, full and timely performance or tender of performance bound
the offeror to a contract. Comment a explained: "If within the time allowed for
accepting the offer full performance has been given, the offeror has received something better than he asked for and is bound, since the only object of requiring a
promise is ultimately to obtain performance of it." The provision in Section 32 of the
Second Restatement giving the offeree the choice of accepting either by promise or
by performance usually will lead to the same result. See Braucher, supra note 29, at
307.
63 The classic statement of this position is Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 56.
The authors state that the object of enforcement in this situation is the prevention of
unjust enrichment. The interest protected is the "restitution interest." Id. at 53-54;
see also Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 743-44. The extent to which the employer's
promise should be enforced (i.e., the appropriate remedy for the employee) is a
separate, but related, question. For a discussion of the remedial issues in the halfcompleted-bargain cases, see Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 744-48.
64 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658 (1973). Although this case is atypical in that it
involves protection of benefits for judges by other judges using a state statute, it is not
atypical in its analytical approach. It serves as a clear illustration of the unilateral
idea at work because of the explicit nature of the analysis, and the articulation by the
court of the implied promise that it found in the offer.
62
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Minnesota state district judges brought an action seeking a declaration that
the state could not reduce their retirement benefits by amending the judges'
retirement statute. The Supreme Court of Minnesota characterized the retirement statute that was in effect when the plaintiffs began their judicial
careers as an offer for a unilateral contract. The court stated the offer as
follows: "If you will stay on the job for at least 15 years and then retire after
having reached the specified retirement age, we will pay you a part of your
salary for the remainder of your life. ' ' 6 Two of the plaintiffs began work
under this statute, but did not reach retirement age until after the legislature
amended the statute to decrease benefits. The court held that as soon as the
judges took office the state was "irrevocably bound" by the terms of the
statute in effect at that time, and that the statutory amendment violated the
66
contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
The contract analysis employed by the court in Sylvestre typifies the
approach taken in many modern employment benefits cases. Courts continue to characterize an employer's benefit offer as an offer inviting a
unilateral contract, despite the criticism that this concept has received. The
primary reason for the popularity of unilateral contract analysis in the
employment area is that the concept.allows a finding of promissory liability
of the employer without the necessity of finding a return promise by the
employee. 67 These cases almost never involve any explicit promise by the
employee. Furthermore, courts are reluctant to infer promises from the
employee's conduct. Few legal principles are more widely shared than the
notion that, unless he explicitly agrees to work for a fixed term, an employee
makes no promise of continued service to his employer. 68 The judges in
Id. at 152, 214 N.W.2d at 665.
Id. at 157, 214 N.W.2d at 667-68.
67 In other words, the unilateral contract idea handles most easily the "mutuality
of obligation" argument. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
68 There may be situations in which a court might find an implied promise by an
employee to give his employer reasonable notice of termination. For example, a
fireman might be liable for leaving the scene of a fire or a corporate lawyer might be
liable for walking out in the middle of a trial. Even in these circumstances, however.
litigation to enforce the promise would be unlikely.
On the employer's side, the general rule remains that, in the absence of a contrary
agreement, employment is at the will of the employer, and the employer, like the
employee, makes no implied promise to continue the relationship. See, e.g., M.
65

66

GLENDON, supra note 58, at 143-70; Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge
Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980);
Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). Recently, however, some
courts have begun to limit the doctrine of employment at will, and.some have used
the unilateral contract concept in the process. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). The unilateral contract idea can
be a useful device for judges who want to limit an employer's right to terminate

without limiting the employee's right to do the same.
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Sylvestre had no contractual obligation to continue to work for the state for
fifteen years. Of course, their choice not to do so would forfeit their rights to
receive pension benefits, but they would not incur any liability to the employer.
The Llewellyn approach adopted by the Second Restatement, which
presents judges with the alternatives of Section 62 and Section 45, does not
work very well in these employment benefit cases. Section 62 is unsatisfactory because it carries with it the unwanted return promise by the
employee 69-it makes the contract bilateral. On the other hand, Section 45 is
limited to the "freak" cases--cases involving offers that can be accepted
only by performance. Llewellyn's description of these "freaks" as "offers
for a speculative prize ' 70 does not fit the employment benefits situation.
There is no speculative prize here. In fact, the situation is one in which "the
action of the offeree is cumulative, and moves with some certainty toward
the objective of the offer." ' 7 1 If one day of work is enough to prevent an
employer from revoking a benefit plan, then a promise to work for the
72
requisite time period should have the same effect.
The employment benefits contract, in short, is neither one in which both
parties are bound, nor one of Llewellyn's freak unilaterals. Courts continue
to use the unilateral contract idea because they do not accept Llewellyn's
test (adopted, in effect, by the Second Restatement) for determining when a
unilateral contract exists. For Llewellyn and the drafters of the Second
Restatement the key question is: When is it clear that the offeror was
seeking acceptance only by performance? In other words, when won't a
promise do? 73 If this is the test, Llewellyn and the restaters are probably
correct in concluding that there are few genuine unilateral contracts. The
presumption in the Second Restatement that an offer invites either promise
or performance makes good sense. The difficulty arises when Section 62
goes on to say that when either a promise or performance would suffice as an
acceptance the beginning of performance operates as a promise to render
74
complete performance.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
71 Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 806.
72 A legally enforceable promise to work for a certain period of time is not
worthless to the employer-offeror in the same sense that, for example, a promise to
catch a criminal would be. Absent unusual circumstances, a promise should be a
permissible mode of acceptance of an offer to provide employment benefits. Of
course, the employee is not entitled to the benefits until he completes his performance of the promise.
73 Llewellyn would have objected to phrasing the question in terms of "promise."
He probably would have preferred: When won't an "overt expression of active
agreement" do? See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 792-98, 815.
74 See supra note 35 for a discussion of the possible qualification of this rule.
69
70
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There is much to be said for a rule that infers a promise by the offeree to
complete the performance he has begun. The comments set out the justifications for the rule: "to preclude the offeree from speculating at the offeror's
expense .

.,

and to protect the offeror in justifiable reliance on the offeree's

implied promise. ' 75 There are situations, however, in which judges
believe that inferring a promise would be inconsistent with the parties'
reasonable understanding of the nature of their relationship or with the
judges' own views about what that relationship should be. 76 In these situations judges find the unilateral contract concept a useful one.
Judges generally do not ask the hypothetical question: When won't a
promise do? Rather they ask: Was there a promise here? In those cases in
which the offeree simply completed performance, judges are likely to call the
contract "unilateral" without speculating about whether a promise would
have been another permissible mode of acceptance. In part-performance
cases, judges seem to need a category that is made difficult for them by the
Second Restatement. They need a category for offers which could have been

accepted either by promise or performance but where the offeree chose to
accept by performance without making a promise. 77 In some of these cases
judges characterize the contract as unilateral in order to avoid the necessity
of finding an obligation of the offeree. Moreover, the unilateral characterization does not leave the offeree unprotected since part performance limits the
offeror's power to revoke. 78 The unilateral contract idea continues to be
useful today because there are more than a few relationships in modern life
in which only one of two parties can be said to be engaging in promissory
activity, even if one grants great latitude to the process of inferring promises.
B.

Some Less Traditional Uses of the Unilateral Contract Idea

Inertia might explain the continued use of the unilateral contract concept
in traditional areas such as broker commissions, options to purchase, and
prizes or rewards. 79 Judges often are reluctant to rethink or reverse established precedent. One could argue that even the employment benefits cases,
while proliferating in number, simply build on old precedents. 80 The expansion of unilateral contract analysis into less traditional areas, however,
suggests that courts are finding some important continuing utility in the
concept.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 62 comment c (1981).

See generally infra Part IV.
It is possible to argue that the Second Restatement allows for such a category by
making the rule of Section 62(2) (inferring a promise by the offeree to complete
performance) "yield to a manifestation of contrary intention." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 comment c (1981). But this argument is not without its
76

77

difficulties. See supra note 35.
7'See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
80 See supra note 42.
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1. Plea Bargains
What law determines whether or not courts will enforce "bargains"?"1 It
should not be surprising that judges confronted with attempts by criminal
defendants to enforce plea bargains have turned to contract law. Some
courts characterize a prosecutor's offer to drop a criminal charge in ex82
change for a plea to a lesser charge as an offer for a unilateral contract.
Under this theory, the criminal defendant has no obligation to enter the plea,
but if he does the prosecution is bound to the terms of the prosecutor's offer.
The results of these cases are mixed. Unilateral contract analysis protects
the criminal defendant if the prosecutor reneges on his promise after the plea
is entered, even though the defendant was never obligated to enter the
plea. 83 But sometimes this approach also leads courts to conclude that the
prosecutor can revoke at any time until the defendant formally enters the
plea. 84 The concept of "beginning performance," which usually mitigates
the harshness of the revocation problem in unilateral contracts cases, often
does not work in the plea bargain cases. It is difficult to construct an
argument for the existence of part performance in entering a plea. Frequently, it is also difficult for a defendant to prove any action in reliance on
the prosecutor's promise, although testifying against criminal associates85 or
waiving a right to a speedy trial 86 might suffice. If the defendant is unable to
show reliance, most courts deny relief if the prosecutor withdrew the offer
87
before the defendant entered the plea.
81

Although Corbin distinguished between "bargain" and "contract," he noted

that "[w]ithout doubt, the word 'bargain' is often used as substantially synonymous
with agreement and contract." I A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 10; see also 1 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 2A; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1932).
82 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.
1980); People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 571-72, 170 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (1980);
State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Collins, 300
N.C. 142, 149, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980).
83 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); United States v.
Serubo, 502 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Tully v. Scheu, 487 F. Supp. 404 (D.N.J.),
rev'd, 637 F.2d 917 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981).

'4 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir.
1980); State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v.
Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 11(Iowa 1979); State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 149, 265
S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980).
85 See Tully v. Scheu, 487 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 637 F.2d 917 (1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981).
86 See People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 574, 170 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1980);

Bullock v. State, 397 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (dissent).
87 In Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth Circuit held
that the criminal defendant's constitutional rights extend beyond his contract rights
and ordered specific performance of a prosecutor's promise even though the prosecutor withdrew his promise before the defendant entered a plea, and even though
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It has been argued that there is no constitutional impediment to a bilateral
theory of the plea bargain agreement, and that courts could enforce a
defendant's promise to enter a plea without violating his constitutional
rights. 8 8 Although theoretically possible, binding the defendant to his promise to enter a plea would create practical difficulties. Courts have established elaborate requirements to make sure that a defendant who pleads
guilty waives his rights voluntarily and intelligently. 89 If courts were to
recognize a binding contract to plead guilty, presumably similar requirements would have to be met at the time of the defendant's promise. The
desire to avoid these complications is undoubtedly one reason for the judicial preference for unilateral contract theory in plea bargain cases. Most
judges, however, choose unilateral contract analysis simply because it accords with their view that plea agreements between prosecutors and criminal
defendants do not call for the defendant to undertake any legally enforceable
obligation to enter a plea. As in the employment setting, the parties understand that only one of them is making a promise.
2.

Other Citizen-State Relationships

The plea bargaining cases invoke the concept of the unilateral contract, in
addition to constitutional due process principles, to define a relationship
between the criminal defendant and the state. As illustrated by Sylvestre v.
State, 90 courts sometimes use unilateral contract analysis together with the
contract clause to define the relationship between the government employee
and his employer. 9' The government-as-employer cases involve use of the
unilateral contract idea to restrict the power of legislatures to rescind their
prior actions. Once a legislature has established a pension program for
government employees, for example, it cannot change that program to92the
detriment of existing employees, at least absent a compelling reason.

the defendant failed to allege reliance. Id. at 16-17. Several courts have rejected the
Cooper analysis. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360,
365 (3d Cir. 1980); State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1979); State v. Collins,
300 N.C. 142, 148, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980); State v. Beckes, 100 Wis. 2d 1, 4-6,
300 N.W.2d 871, 873 (1980).
88 Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies.for Broken Plea Bargains,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 525 n.189 (1978). The authors recognize the difficulties
suggested in the next few lines of text.
89 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969); Marchibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
90 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes
64-66.
91 See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 538-54 (D. Conn. 1980);
Marvel v. Dannemann, 490 F. Supp. 170, 174-77 (D. Del. 1980).
92 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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The unilateral contract idea also can be used to restrict administrative
action. In Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social Welfare, 93
the plaintiffs, a group of licensed nursing homes in Kansas, prevailed on a
unilateral contract theory in an action challenging a change in the method of
calculating the amount of payments for nursing services under state and
federal institutional care programs. The Kansas State Board of Social Welfare attempted to effectuate the change in policy by announcing it in an
"Adult Care Homes Manual" and later by issuing an amended regulation.
The Tenth Circuit first upheld the trial court's finding that the attempted
94
change was inconsistent with the applicable Kansas statute.
The question then became whether the plaintiffs could sue the state
agency. The Tenth Circuit approved the trial court's conclusion that they
could do so because a unilateral contract existed between the State Board of
Social Welfare and the plaintiffs. The court said that the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' services were contained in state plans filed with the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The method of compensation
set forth in the Kansas statutes was part of the arrangement. By performing
the required services the plaintiffs became entitled to the statutory payment
amounts.
The court, in affirming the declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs, rejected
without comment the defendants' claim that the Kansas statute establishing
the method of payment was "a legislative act and therefore not a contract of
the Board." 95 The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiffs could
not prevail because a Kansas statute declared that state agencies are immune
from liability on an implied contract. The court said that the plan, the
statutory measure of payments, and the requirements for licenses were
96
enough to create an express contract.
The Seneca analysis suggests another potentially open-ended use for
unilateral contract theory. If courts characterize statutory rights as "contractual," presumably the "contracting parties" can enforce them. In other
words, the existence of an implied private right of action may depend on the
courts' willingness to employ contractual analysis.
The combination of unilateral contract analysis with a reinvigorated contract clause 97 creates enormous possibilities for restricting reductions in

490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 841 (1974).
See id. at 1329-32. The Kansas statute provided for the payment to participating
nursing homes of "reasonable, usual and customary" charges. The manual and
subsequent regulation adopted by the Board of Social Welfare authorized payment
on a "cost plus a limited profit" basis. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
holding that the administrative language was inconsistent with that of the statute.
91 Id. at 1332.
96 See id.
97 See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, which imposed obligations on em93
94
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governmental obligations not only to government employees and military
personnel but to recipients of public benefits as well. Citizens beginning
public job training programs, students in public schools and colleges, and
perhaps even Social Security recipients can make plausible unilateral contract claims. 98 In the present period of retrenchment, courts may be faced
with a large number of such cases. I expect courts to be cautious about
"locking in" governments to particular programs, policies, and procedures,
particularly in an age of attempts to reduce taxes and the size of governments. 99
Although there has been a significant movement toward contractual analysis in some areas of government-citizen relations, in others courts continue
to reject it. m°O The crucial questions thus become how and why courts

ployer beyond those voluntarily assumed, violates the contract clause of the United
States Constitution); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
(contract clause prohibits retroactive statutory repeal of a statutory covenant limiting
the ability of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize rail
passenger transportation from revenues and reserves pledged as security for bonds
issued by the Port Authority); Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance
of the Contract Clause, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Note, Revival of the Contract

Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 65 VA. L. REV. 377 (1979).
98 The current position of the United States Supreme Court is that Social Security
benefits are not contractual. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In
Flemming the Court upheld a section of the Social Security Act that terminated the
plaintiff's old age benefits after he was deported. The Court took the position that the
benefits were not contractual because "each worker's benefits... are not dependent
on the degree to which he was called upon to support the system of taxation." Id. at
609-10. The Court expressed concern that making Social Security benefits "accrued
property rights" would deprive the system of the "flexibility and boldness" necessary to meet changing conditions. Id. at 610. See also United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) ("[R]ailroad benefits, like social security
benefits, are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time.").
Public policy considerations, not inescapable logic or contract theory, have produced
these results. If the Justices decide to weigh these policy considerations differently,
they could easily construct a contractual theory to support different results. See infra
Part IV C.
99 This caution probably will be manifested as a reluctance to apply contract

analysis at the outset, because once a court determines that a contractual right does
exist, an abrogation of that right in order to lessen expenditures is generally considered to be no defense to a contract claim against the government. See Caola v. United
States, 404 F. Supp. 1101,1107 (D. Conn. 1975) (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292

U.S. 571, 580 (1934)).
100 For example, United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g 325 F.
Supp. 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1971), involved an appeal from a conviction for refusal to
submit to induction. Defendant argued t hat his application for voluntary induction
was an offer for a unilateral contract that could be withdrawn at any time before
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action

are

"contractual"--questions that will be explored in Part IV. In any event,
when courts do seek to impose contractual obligations on governmental
bodies, the unilateral contract serves as a convenient device for that end
because it does not require the imposition of a promissory obligation on the
private citizen or organization.
3.

Contracts with Schools

In recent years the relationship between students and colleges or universities has generated unprecedented levels of litigation and scholarly attention. 01 Although much of the discussion in the cases and journals involves
contractual analysis of the relationship, few courts or scholars explicitly
characterize the student-school contract as either unilateral or bilateral. At
first glance the contract may appear bilateral; the school promises to provide
the curriculum and to award a degree upon the student's satisfactory corn-

acceptance, that the only acceptance would be the act of induction, and that failing to
report for induction was a revocation of the offer before acceptance. The trial court
found that defendant's application for voluntary induction was indeed an offer for a
unilateral contract. See 325 F. Supp. at 1124. The court convicted the defendant,
however, on the grounds that the federal government accepted his offer by sending
him an accelerated order to report for induction before he revoked.
The Ninth Circuit began by saying: "The argument made in support of the appeal is
imaginative, but it fails." 453 F.2d at 863. It rejected entirely the contract approach:
"This contract approach ignores the fact that duties under the Selective Service
System are not consensual." Id. And in a footnote: "We cannot believe that Congress in enacting [the Selective Service Act], or the Selective Service System in
adopting [administrative regulationsl had hidden intentions to incorporate into law a
unilateral contract concept which would be disruptive of the orderly conduct of the
system." Id. at 863 n.1.
"o'See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Peretti v.
Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981):
Paulsen v. Golden Gate Univ., 25 Cal. 3d 803, 602 P.2d 778, 159 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1979); Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972); Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970);
Abrams v. Illinois College of Podiatric Medicine, 77 111. App. 3d 471, 395 N.E.2d 1061
(1979); Eisele v. Ayers, 63 I11.
App. 3d 1039, 381 N.E.2d 21 (1978); Essigmann v.
Western New England College, 1981 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 846, 419 N.E.2d 1047;
Jones v. Vassar College, 59 Misc. 2d 296, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Drucker
v. New York Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968), rev'd,
59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1969), aff'd, 33 A.D.2d 1106,
308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1970); Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 33 Or. App. 559,
577 P.2d 534 (1977), rev'd, 287 Or. 303, 599 P.2d 444 (1979); Lewis v. Curry College,
89 Wash. 2d 565, 573 P.2d 1312 (1978); Ray, Toward Contractual Rights for College
Students, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 163 (1981); Note, Judicial Review of the UniversityStudent Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 95 (1973).
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pletion of the academic program, and the student promises to pay the tuition
02
and to follow the school's rules and regulations.1
Most schools, however, do not permit the student to accept the offer of
admission with a promise to pay tuition; the student cannot register until
tuition is paid. 10 3 In this situation, the school's offer is an offer for a
unilateral contract. Compliance by the student with the rules and regulations
of the school is required for the continued provision of instruction and the
eventual granting of the degree, but it is not the subject of an independent
promise enforceable in court. Perhaps some evidence that the relationship is
unilateral is that, with very few exceptions, 10 4 all the cases are brought by
students against schools and not by schools against students.
Sometimes schools will offer honors or awards for special performance:
"Ifyour grade point average is in the top five percent of those of all students,
we will grant your degree, magna cum laude." The student obviously has
made no promise to attain a certain average; failure to do so does not subject
him to liability. When viewed in this manner, the school's offer for these
honors seems analogous to offers for rewards-the classic "true unilaterals."'' 0 Once again, the unilateral contract concept can supply the legal
theory for students using the courts to establish or expand their legal rights
against schools.
C.

The Adaptability of'the Unilateral Contract Concept

Courts have employed unilateral contract analysis in a wide range of
factual settings since the publication of the first tentative draft of the Second
Restatement of Contracts in 1964. These cases demonstrate that the Second
Restatement has not succeeded in relegating unilateral contracts cases to
Llewellyn's "freak tent." One reason that judges and lawyers have not
curtailed their use of unilateral contract analysis is that they have never
accepted the Llewellyn test for determining the existence of a unilateral
contract. The Llewellyn test focuses on the offeror; a true unilateral contract
can be formed only if the offeror would not be satisfied with a promissory

102 See Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979) (quoting Note,
Expulsion of College and Profssional Students--Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 174, 183 (1962)).
103 It could be argued that a student's letter to a school "accepting" the school's

offer of admission and perhaps enclosing a small deposit should be enough to prevent
the school from revoking its offer. On the other hand, to conclude that the student by
these actions undertakes a legally enforceable obligation to pay tuition seems inconsistent with the expectations of both parties in this era of multiple applications for
admission.
104 See Albermarle Educ. Found., Inc. v. Basnight, 4 N.C. App. 652, 167 S.E.2d
486 (1969).
105See

supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
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acceptance. 106 Judges and lawyers focus on the offeree; a unilateral contract
is formed when the offeree does not make any promise.
A more important reason for the continued use of unilateral contract
analysis in contemporary litigation is that it has proved adaptable to the
needs of judges and lawyers in areas unforeseen by Llewellyn and apparently by the drafters of the Second Restatement. Relatively few of the
modern unilateral contracts cases involve traditional commercial exchanges
(sales of goods), and it was primarily the traditional commercial context that
Llewellyn had in mind when he unleashed his attack on the unilateral
contract idea. Llewellyn did not foresee the usefulness in a highly organized
society of a concept that allows a plaintiff to assert the defendant's promissory obligation and at the same time preempt the argument that he himself
did not undertake any obligation. Many of the modern unilateral contracts
cases involve claims by an individual offeree against an organizational
offeror-the little guy against the big organization. In this context courts
often are quite willing to conclude that the organization made a promise even
though the individual did not.
Cook v. Advertiser Company 107 provides a good illustration of how far the
unilateral contract idea can be extended. A group of black plaintiffs brought
an action against a newspaper publisher for violation of their constitutional
and statutory rights in maintaining an all-white society page. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant newspaper distributed printed forms to those
wishing to have a wedding announcement appear on the society page. When
whites submitted completed forms and pictures, the newspaper always published them on the society page; when the plaintiffs submitted the same
items, the defendant refused to publish them on the society page but said
they would be published only on a "Negro news page."'10 8 The plaintiffs
claimed that the newspaper made an implied offer to publish upon presentation of the picture and questionnaire. The Fifth Circuit majority held that
there was no contract, implied or otherwise. "There was no agreement to
publish and there was no consideration received for any publication actually
made."' 1 9 Judge Wisdom, concurring specially, took a somewhat different
approach. After setting forth the unilateral contract argument, which he
found "appealing," he stated: "Yet the argument proceeds from a mistaken
premise. Not every exchange of conferred benefits creates a contract."' ' 10
He went on to say that no one, white or black, has an enforceable right to
publication of a wedding announcement. Such a right would run counter to
the first amendment: "It is most unlikely that any court in our land could

106
107
108

109

See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 1212 (1971).

Id. at 1120-21.
Id. at 1122.

110 Id. at 1123.
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constitutionally enforce a 'promise' by a newspaper to publish any particular
item of news."" '
In Cook, the plaintiffs used the unilateral contract idea to attempt to
vindicate an infringement of civil rights because the absence of "state
action" precluded a direct attack on the newspaper's alleged discriminatory
practices.11 2 Judge Wisdom apparently rejected the analysis only because of
its impact on first amendment rights. It is hard to imagine a case that is
further removed from traditional unilateral contract fact patterns. Modern
unilateral contracts cases such as Cook explore the limits of obligation in
evolving areas of law that have little to do with commercial exchange.
IV.

A.

SEARCHING FOR LIMITS ON THE USE OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT

Unilateral Contract as a Tool for Expanding Civil Obligation

I have attempted to demonstrate that lawyers and judges recently have
been choosing unilateral contract analysis with remarkable and increasing
frequency. In assessing this trend toward the unilateral contract, however, it
is important to recognize an important change in the way that unilateral
contract is being used. In Llewellyn's time, unilateral contract was predominantly a defendant's theory; the plaintiff pressed a bilateral contract argument and the defendant claimed to have made an offer for a unilateral
contract which he revoked before the plaintiff's acceptance by performance.
In modern times, unilateral contract is predominantly a plaintiff's theory.
With some exceptions," 3 courts employ unilateral contract analysis when
they find liability and reject it when they deny liability.
The crucial, difficult question facing the courts in the modern cases is not
whether to choose unilateral or bilateral contract analysis, but whether to
employ any contractual analysis at all. Judges and lawyers have been ex-

"I Id. A recent case held, however, that ordering specific performance of a
contract to print a political advertisement does not infringe first amendment rights.
Herald Telephone v. Fatouros, 431 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
12 The plaintiffs advanced the theory of implied contract in order to establish a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which provides that "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory
to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " 458 F.2d at
1121. The district court initially dismissed the Section 1981 claim on the grounds that
that section did not apply to private action. 323 F. Supp. at 1217. The Fifth Circuit
subsequently decided in Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971), that a claim could be stated against a private
individual under Section 1981.
113 Some of the plea bargaining cases, see supra notes 81-89 and accompanying
text, and the "exploding-soda-bottle" cases, see infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text, involved defensive use of unilateral contract theory.
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panding contract analysis into new areas and situations. It is no coincidence
that they have resorted to unilateral contract in this process. The need to find
an enforceable return promise provides some limitation on the use of bilateral contract theory to impose liability. Plaintiffs pursuing a bilateral theory
have to prove, and sometimes subject themselves to, their own promissory
obligation. Plaintiffs using the unilateral contract device, like tort plaintiffs,
have to prove only the defendant's obligation.
More often than not, the source of the defendant's obligation in modern
unilateral contracts cases is an implied, rather than an express, promise.
Moreover, the implied promise often takes the following form: "As long as
you keep doing what you've been doing, or are about to do, I'll keep doing
what I've been doing, or am about to do."' 1 4 In other words, the defendant's alleged promise is a promise to maintain the status quo, and the
plaintiff's performance is simply continuing the status quo. The only limit on
the use of unilateral contract theory is the court's willingness to find the
alleged implied promise. Any assessment, therefore, of the appropriateness
of modern judicial use of unilateral contract theory must focus on the
promissory basis of the asserted obligation: Did the defendant really make a
promise and, if so, should that promise serve as the basis for determining the
existence and extent of liability?
The Promissory Basis of Unilateral Obligation

B.

The Second Restatement of Contracts defines a promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."IIAs this definition suggests, whether it is appropriate to infer a promise
depends on the facts of each case; general pronouncements cannot provide
much assistance.' 16 Charles Fried begins his book, Contractas Promise, by

114

Some judges qualify the implied promise: "I will keep doing what I have been

doing unless I have a good reason to change." Judges thus attempt to insure some
flexibility by applying reasonableness standards to modifications of existing policies.
See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 552-53 (D. Conn. 1980); Marvel v.
Dannemann, 490 F. Supp. 170. 176 (D. Del. 1980); Babbitt v. Wilson, 9 Cal. App. 3d
288, 290-91, 88 Cal. Rptr. 623, 624 (1970); Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho
512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968); Drans v. Providence College, 119 R.I. 845, 856-58,
383 A.2d 1033, 1039-40 (1978): Weaver v. Evans, 80 Wash. 2d 461,478, 495 P.2d 639,
648-49 (1972).
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
116 Indeed, Corbin argued that there is really no distinction between express and
implied contracts. Words are a form of conduct, which, like other conduct, can be
susceptible to different interpretations. He cites the following language from Great
Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 F. 603 (7th Cir. 1917):
Precedent can throw but little light on the sound interpretation of such contracts,
especially as to implying unexpressed obligations; each has its own individuality,
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articulating the principle underlying the promissory basis of obligation (he
calls it the "promise principle") as "that principle by which persons may
impose on themselves obligations where none existed before." 1 17 The concept of the self-created obligation provides the key for evaluating judicial use
of unilateral contract theory to impose liability. Are courts imposing liability
because of words or actions of the defendant manifesting an intention to
make a commitment, or are they using unilateral contract as a device 8to
enforce obligations arising from some sense of community standards?"
In most cases, of course, both the defendant's actions and community
standards play a role in determining liability, and it is difficult to separate and
weigh the contributions of each. If the defendant's commitment-making
actions do not predominate, unilateral contract is an inappropriate rationalization that allows judges to avoid confronting their true motivations.1 19 This section will examine first the employment benefit cases, in
which judges generally have used the unilateral contract idea appropriately,
and then a group of personal injury cases, in which judges have misused
unilateral contract theory.' 2 0
1. The Employment Benefit Cases
Although judges usually are reluctant to find legally enforceable obligations of employees in employment benefit cases,1 21 they often are willing to
its own background and surrounding circumstances. Words are only symbols,
and at times, even the most formal agreement, but elliptical expressions of the
mutual understanding.
1 A. CORBIN, supra note 6, at 40-41 & n.40. See generally id. ch. 25.
117

118

C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1 (1981).
In Chapter 1 of Contract as Promise Fried explains nicely the debate between

those (like himself) who believe that contractual obligation is "essentially selfimposed" and those who "den[y] the coherence or the independent viability of the
promise principle." He explains the latter position as follows:
Legal obligation can be imposed only by the community, and so in imposing it
the community must be pursuing its goals and imposing its standards, rather than
neutrally endorsing those of the contracting parties.
Id. at 2-3.
119 The assumption here is that judicial candor generally leads to better judicial
decisions. See, e.g., 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 561, at 279.
120 The purpose here is not to question the results in these cases but rather to
evaluate the appropriateness of the methods of analysis that the judges have employed. Any ultimate judgment about results would require an articulation of the

ultimate goals of legal regulation (such as wealth maximization, fairness in wealth
distribution, or the like). This Article also does not consider the effect of the judicial
results on primary behavior. For example, inferring a promise by an employer to
continue a benefit plan might have some impact on future decisions of that employer

and other employers about whether to institute new benefit plans. See generally
Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89
YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
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recognize employer obligations. Sometimes employers make express prom-

ises (to maintain a certain level of pension contributions, for example) in
written or oral employment agreements. Courts have little difficulty enforc-

ing such promises, usually by saying that an employee accepted the employer's promissory offer by beginning to work or by continuing to work for the
employer.' 2 2 In a majority of the reported decisions involving unilateral
contract analysis, however, employers have not made express promises.
When courts do not find express promissory language, they are not reluc-

tant to infer promises. If a personnel manual or statement of company policy
contains a description of existing benefit plans, courts often infer a promise
that the employer will maintain these plans as described, even though the
manual or policy statement does not contain any language about the future
existence of the plans.' 23 Sometimes the employee does not even offer

evidence of "promise," beyond a past pattern of paying the benefits in
question. 24 Even in these situations, courts often are willing to find an
implied promise.
Although whether it is reasonable to infer employer promises depends on
the particular facts of each case, in most cases judicial recognition of an
employer's implied promise to retain a benefit plan that he describes to a
new or continuing employee seems justifiable. But what if the employer's
description of the benefit plan (or the plan itself) expressly negates any
promise?125 What if the plan states:
This Plan shall not be deemed to constitute a contract between the
Company and any employee or to be a consideration for, or a condition
126
of, the employment of any employee.

122 See, e.g., Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 121 Ariz. 514, 591
P.2d 1002 (1979); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Fries v.
United Mine Workers, 30 111. App. 3d 575, 333 N.E.2d 600 (1975); State ex rel. Nilsen
v. Oregon State Motor Ass'n, 248 Or. 133, 432 P.2d 512 (1967); Harryman v.
Roseburg Rural Fire Protection Dist., 244 Or. 631, 420 P.2d 51 (1966).
123 See, e.g., Miller v. Dictaphone Corp., 334 F. Supp. 840 (D. Or. 1971); Dahi v.
Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346
Mich'. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956); Novack v. Bilnor Corp., 26 A.D.2d 572, 271
N.Y.S.2d 117 (1966); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976);
Toch v. Eric Schuster Corp., 490 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
124 See, e.g., Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 26 A.D.2d 516, 270
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1966), rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1968); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 271 Or. 588, 533 P.2d 339 (1975);
Thatcher v. Wasatch Chem. Co., 29 Utah 2d 189, 507 P.2d 365 (1973); Simon v.
Riblet Tramway Co., 8 Wash. App. 289, 505 P.2d 1291, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975
(1973); see also Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 444 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1971).
125 E.g., Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd,
542 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
126 Id. at 890.
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Or what if the employer states that his action is "voluntary" and "is not to
12 7
be deemed to create a contractual obligation"?
It is obviously much more difficult to find an implied promise by an
employer when he expressly says he is making no such promise. In recent
litigation, 128 however, neither of the above clauses proved fatal to the
employee's case. It seems stretching the point 29 but still defensible to say
that sometimes actions speak louder than words, and that if an employer's
actions indicate that he is intentionally creating expectations or inducing
reliance, a verbal disclaimer should be ineffective. For example, if every
year for twenty years an employer provides a Christmas bonus equal to two
weeks' wages, it might be reasonable to infer a promise to continue to pay
that bonus even if there is a written bonus plan somewhere that says that the
employer is making no such promise.' 30
1 On the other hand, if the judges are
saying not only that the specific disclaimers in these particular cases were
ineffective, but also that all attempts at disclaimer would necessarily be
ineffective, then a promise by the employer cannot explain the decisions to
impose liability.
There are a few cases that are perhaps even more difficult to reconcile
with the promissory principle than the express-negation cases. In such
cases, the employee-offeree began or continued work without any knowledge of the benefit plan he later sought to enforce through litigation. In
Dangott v. ASG Industries, Inc., 13I a former employee sued his employer
for severance pay under a company policy which provided severance pay to
employees under certain circumstances. The employer argued that the employee who brought suit did not rely on the existence of the severance pay
policy in any way, and, in fact, did not even know about the existence of the
policy until a short time before his termination. The court said: "We might
Novack v. Bilnor Corp., 26 A.D.2d 572, 573,271 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (1966); see
also Matthews v. Swift & Co., 465 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1972) ("No Contractual Rights
Conferred").
128 Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 542
F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 581 (1977); Novack v. Bilnor Corp., 26
A.D.2d 572, 573, 271 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (1966).
129 Lon Fuller pointed to cases in which employees recovered bonuses from
employers despite express disclaimers of legal liability as examples in which "the
principle of reimbursing reliance is regarded as overriding the principle of private
autonomy." Fuller, supra note 61, at 811 & n.16.
130 It is interesting to note that once an employer establishes a practice of paying
yearly bonuses they may constitute "wages" and "conditions of employment"
within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the N.L.R.A. Thus, any proposed change in the
payment of these bonuses is a mandatory subject for collective bargaining under
Section 8(a)(5). See Century Elec. Motor Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1971);
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1963).
131 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976).
127
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be impressed with such argument if we were dealing in other contract areas
such as sales of real estate or personalty, or contracts dealing with warranty."' 13 The court noted that the employment contract at issue was not
negotiated by a strong union, and construed the contract "most strongly"
against the employer.13 3 Finally,
ASG promulgated the controversial administrative procedure,
#9-3-29 and sent it to supervisory parties for no other purpose except to
give notice and import knowledge of it to its employees, and thus
stabilize and promote a contented work force. Although plaintiff did not
have actual knowledge of its provisions, until shortly before his termination, publication of #9-3-29 is the equivalent of constructive knowledge
134
on the part of all employees not specifically excluded.
There are very few cases that, like Dangott, specifically confront the knowledge (or reliance) issue and hold that the plaintiff does not have to prove
actual reliance or even actual knowledge. 13 1 Most do not even discuss
knowledge or reliance. Opinions usually say simply that an offer was made
by the creation of a benefit policy and that it was accepted by the beginning
or continuation of work by the employee. In those cases that do raise the
issue, judges usually say that some showing of knowledge (or reliance) is
required, and go on to find that knowledge or reliance. 13 6 Rarely will a court
deny relief to an employee because he failed to establish knowledge or
reliance (assuming that the employee met all the eligibility requirements at
the time of the creation or continuing existence of the policy). 137
The traditional view, embodied in the first Restatement, 138 held that an
offeree had to know of the existence of an offer and had to perform with the
intention to accept that offer in order to form a binding unilateral contract.
The Second Restatement significantly changes these rules. It provides that
an offeree who begins performance without knowledge of an offer can accept

Id. at 383.
Id.
134 Id.
"I But see Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. Civ.
132

133

App. 1978) (holding "that the question of reliance is not significant").
136 See, e.g., Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)

(knowledge and reliance); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 489, 356 A.2d 221,
231 (1976) (knowledge); Ehrle v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of America, 530 S.W.2d
482, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (knowledge and reliance); Rose City Transit Co. v. City
of Portland, 271 Or. 588, 594-95, 533 P.2d 339, 342 (1975) (knowledge); see also
Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 501 (Mo. 1971) (employee's acts
in reliance result in an "enforceable bilateral contract").
137 But see Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965). But even in Molumby there were other reasons for the denial of recovery.
138 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 53, 55 (1932).
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by completing performance with knowledge. 139 It presumes, in effect, an
intention to accept when an offeree who knows of an offer renders the
performance called for by the offeror. 140 In Dangott, the employer alleged
that the employee learned of the severance pay policy shortly before termination, and thus the court could have used the Second Restatement to find

for the employee. 141
Although the court could have found reliance by the employee in the
Dangott case, reliance was not the basis for its decision. Yet Dangott is not
an aberration. To illustrate, consider two employees who begin to do the
same job for the same employer at the same time and at the same pay level.
The company has a severance pay policy under which any employee who
works for the company for at least one year and then is discharged for
reasons not his fault receives a severance pay award equal to twice his
monthly wages at the time of discharge. Employee A knows of the policy
before he starts to work for the company; employee B does not. After three
years the company discharges both A and B when it closes down their entire
department, but refuses to make the severance pay awards. B learns of the
existence of the severance pay policy after the discharge, and both A and B
sue the employer.
Few courts would rule for A but not for B in this situation. Since A and B
did the same work, and were both members of the class intended to be the
beneficiaries of the severance pay policy, judges would want to treat them
equally. It seems then that B acquires rights by virtue of his status (or
role) 42 as an eligible employee. That role entitles him to receive benefits
even if he does not know it.
Courts frequently use the word "entitled" or "entitlement" in employment benefits cases. 4 3 The suggestion that an employee's status as a
member of a class of eligible employees may be the underlying source of
entitlement to benefits in these cases does not fully explain what is going on,
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 51 (1981). Even this requirement

might be dispensed with if the employment contract were viewed as a "standardized
agreement." See in fra note 149.
140

See id. § 53 & comment b; see also id. Reporter's Note.

Another possible approach would be to say that the employee did know about
the existence of an offer; he simply did not know the particular term that he now uses
as the basis of his claim. This approach might lead to an analysis of the enforceability
of standardized terms. See infra note 149.
142 See Rehbinder, Status, Contract and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941,
950-51 (1971).
143 See, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir.
1972); Fujimoto v. Rio Grande Pickle Co., 414 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1969); Gilbreath
v. East Arkansas Planning & Dev. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 912, 922 (E.D. Ark. 1979);
Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Garrett v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 102, 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Miller v.
Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974).
141
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however. Why should one's status or role as an employee create an entitlement? Perhaps judges are motivated by some underlying sense of values
such as fairness or equality or even redistribution of wealth-values similar
to those that might motivate legislators to enact a minimum wage law, for
example. Under a minimum wage statute, if a person is employed as a wage
earner, that status alone entitles him to a certain amount of money regardless
of what he knows or understands and regardless of what his employer says
or does. But judges do not require that employers provide severance pay
awards to discharged employees. 144 Nor does the concept of equal treatment
provide a complete explanation. 14 5 If employee A goes to work for an
employer who has a severance pay policy and employee B goes to work for
an employer in the same business who does not have such a policy, A gets
the money and B does not, even though B has done the same work, has
received the same wages, and is equally necessitous. Furthermore, A gets
the money even if he did not know of the existence of the policy while he
worked for the employer who had the policy.
The concept of entitlement by status cannot fully explain the results in the
employment benefit cases. We must look to employer conduct as the source
of the entitlement-creating status categories. But can we label the necessary
employer conduct a "promise"? Can promise be the source of obligation to
an employee who does not even know that a promise was made? Suppose
that the Board of Directors of XYZ Company formally passes a resolution
establishing a two months severance pay award. Through an oversight the
officers of XYZ fail to implement the new policy and never announce it to
the employees. A lawyer for a discharged employee happens to discover the
resolution and sues for the award. I would expect most courts to deny
recovery in this case, though the directors of XYZ intended that the creation
to the employees and that the employees act in
of the plan be communicated
46
reliance upon it. 1
Although a promise generally must be communicated to the "promisee"
to create any legal obligation (under some definitions, a promise must be
communicated to qualify as a promise147), a promissory theory can support
144 Indeed, legislation which attempted to require severance payments to existing
employees in the event of discharge might run afoul of the contract clause. See Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978).
141 For an argument that the concept of equality can never provide a complete
explanation for legal or moral decisions, see infra note 201.
146 See Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1033-36 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(suggesting that a communicated corporate resolution may or may not give rise to
contractual rights, but an uncommunicated resolution is no more than an expression
of intention or policy and cannot create contractual rights); Molumby v. Shapleigh
Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (concluding that a noncontributory pension plan does not become an enforceable contract without notification to the
employee that the plan was in effect).
14, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2(), (2), (3) (1981); 1 A.
CORBIN,

supra note 6, § 13, at 29 ("A promise is an expression of intention that the
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the results of even those employment cases that award benefits to employees
who were ignorant of the benefits in question until after the employment
relationship terminated. In these cases the employer made the promises to a
class of employees; communication to some members of the class was
sufficient for all. Most courts recognize that the relationship between an
employer and his employees is based fundamentally on agreement; it is a
contract. The contract, however, does not always follow the traditional
model, in which individual contractors bargain over terms, and courts seek
to implement individual intentions.
The modern employment contract is often a standardized agreement (one
could almost say a "collective bargaining agreement" without a union)
between the employer organization and the class of employees; an important goal of the parties and the courts is to promote uniformity, predictability, and stability in the relationship. 4 8 It would be not only unfair but also
impractical and inefficient to base an employee's right to recover on whether
he read through the descriptions of company benefit policies that he might
not understand and almost certainly could not change. 149 Employers establish benefit plans intending to create expectations and induce reliance by
employees as a group. They should not be able to escape liability on the
grounds that a particular employee was unaware of the plan and thus did not
receive a promise. The justification for holding the employer liable to the
employee without knowledge thus seems ultimately to depend on the promise principle as supplemented by notions of equity and administrative
convenience.
promisor will conduct himself in a specified way or bring about a specified result in
the future, communicated in such manner to a promisee that he may justly expect
performance and may reasonably rely thereon."); C. FRIED, supra note 117, at 40-41
("A promise is made to someone; it gives the promisee a right to expect, to call for its
performance; and so by implication a promise, to be complete, to count as a promise,
must in some sense be taken up by its beneficiary." (emphasis in original)).
148 See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973).

Although this analysis perhaps stretches the "promise principle," it is within
contemporary contract doctrine. Judges in cases like Dangott easily could invoke
Section 211 of the Second Restatement of Contracts to find for employees who were
without knowledge of particular benefits. That section, captioned "Standardized
Agreements," begins by asserting that when a party assents to what he has reason to
believe is a standardized writing he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement.
This language incorporates the common law "duty to read" idea, and is usually
employed to enforce terms of the writing against the assenting individual. But if an
employee may be held to unfavorable terms of the writing despite his lack of actual
knowledge of them, should he not in turn be able to enforce the favorable terms?
Section 211(2) lends further support to this analysis. That subsection provides:
(2) Such a [standardized] writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating
alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
149
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2. The Personal Injury Cases
A few of the cases that discuss the concept of the unilateral contract in
particular and theories of contract formation in general involve attempts to
recover for personal injuries. The plaintiff may be pursuing a contract theory
because an immunity doctrine or a statute of limitations bars a tort claim.
Even if a tort claim is available, the plaintiff may prefer a contract claim
because he will not have to prove negligence. Some courts have been
receptive to personal injury claims based on unilateral contract theory. In
Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education,110 spectators at a high school

football game sued in tort and contract to recover for injuries suffered when
a viewing stand collapsed. The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained a
dismissal of the tort claim on immunity grounds, but reversed a dismissal of
the contract claim.
For what we have here is a unilateral contract, with the promisor-board
of education, as proprietor, upon receiving the admission price, promising admission by ticket and the performance of all other contractual
duties arising from the circumstances, including the implied promise
that the premises15 are reasonably safe for the purpose of viewing the
athletic contest. 1
The contract that the Sims court found was "unilateral" in the "halfexecuted" sense; 1" 2 only the seller of the ticket had any continuing obligation because the buyer had already performed by paying for the ticket.I5 3 In
sale of ticket cases, as in products liability and malpractice cases, the
buyer's duties end with payment, but the seller's duties do not end with
delivery.
Courts have been less receptive to unilateral contract theory when it has
been used to defend personal injury claims. A small group of cases dealing
with the hazards of grocery shopping provides a good illustration. 154 In each
of these cases the plaintiff was shopping in a self-service grocery store and
picked up one or more bottles of soda. A bottle exploded and caused injury
before the plaintiff paid for the soda at the check-out counter. The initial
problem for the plaintiff seeking to recover from the grocer on a contract

1SO

337 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1976).
Id. at 1314.

151
152 See supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
153 Llewellyn might have classified the Sims contract as a "pseudo-unilateral"

on
the grounds that a promise to pay for the ticket might have been a permissible mode
of acceptance. See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 805-14.
154 See, e.g., Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691
(1976); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332
A.2d 1 (1975), aff'g Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874
(1974); Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441
(1972); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979).
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(breach of warranty) theory was that earlier cases had held that the contract
was not formed until the buyer reached the check-out counter, because until
the clerk rang up the item on the cash register the customer could return the
item to the shelf. ,

55

Self-service shopping seems easily susceptible to unilateral contract analysis. Either the grocer makes an offer by placing the goods on the shelf with
prices attached and the customer accepts by bringing the goods to the
check-out counter and tendering the price, 15 6 or the customer makes an offer
to purchase when he tenders the groceries at the check-out counter and the
grocer accepts the offer when he rings up the charge on the register.' 57 In
neither event does the customer incur any obligation before reaching the
check-out counter.
In Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,' 5 8 the

defendant-grocer urged a unilateral contract analysis, arguing that there was
no contract because acceptance had not occurred before the bottle
exploded. The court could have responded that this was indeed a unilateral
contract situation but that, once the customer had begun performance by
picking up the item, the store could not revoke. 5 9 But an irrevocable offer to
sell is not a contract of sale, and a sale contract must exist before the plaintiff
can recover on a warranty theory. 160 Thus the court, relying on the broad

'55 See, e.g., Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305
(1946); Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 A.D. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, aff'd, 304 N.Y.
821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952); Pharmaceutical Soc'y v. Boots Cash Chemists, [1953] 1
Q.B. 401.
156 See Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946).
157 See Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 A.D. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, aff'd, 304 N.Y.
821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952); Pharmaceutical Soc'y v. Boots Cash Chemists, [1953] 1
Q.B. 401.
158 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975), aff'g Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md.
App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974).
15. Comment 3 to Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that the
beginning of performance can be effective as an acceptance if it unambiguously
expresses the offeree's intention to engage himself and if the offeree gives notice of
his acceptance to the offeror within a reasonable time. The comment continues:
Nothing in this section however bars the possibility that under the common law
performance begun may have an intermediate effect of temporarily barring

revocation of the offer, or at the offeror's option, final effect in constituting
acceptance.
Under this language the question would become whether the picking up of the soda
was a beginning of performance or "mere preparation" for performance. If the court
found it to be a beginning of performance, the offeror could not revoke. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981).
160 The cases have held that Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(governing implied warranties of merchantability) requires the plaintiff to prove the
existence of a sale or a contract of sale in order to recover for breach of the warranty.
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language of Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 1 decided that
a bilateral contract was formed when the customer picked up the soda.
Picking up the soda was a reasonable mode of acceptance and carried an

62
implied promise to take the soda to the check-out counter and pay for it. 1
Perhaps Llewellyn would have approved of this use of Section 2-206. The
language of 2-206 is broad, the approach is flexible, and the goal is to remove
traditional impediments to contract formation. A promise to pay may be a
satisfactory mode of acceptance to the grocer-at least to those grocers who

allow payment by check.

163

The difficulty is that the customer could return the item without liability.
The Giant Food court confronted that question directly and quoted the
opinion of the lower court with approval:

"... Here the evidence that the retailer permits the customer to 'change
his mind' indicates only an agreement between the parties to permit the
consumer to end his contract with the retailer irrespective of a breach of
the agreement by the retailer. It does not indicate that an agreement
64
does not exist prior to the exercise of this option by the consumer." 1
Can there be a valid bilateral contract if one party can terminate his promise
without notice and without liability to the other--even in this modern age? 65
See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1976);
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 602-03, 332
A.2d 1, 7 (1975), aff'g Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874
(1974); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (Okla. 1979).
161 (1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances ....
U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(a) (1978).
162 273 Md. at 603-07, 332 A.2d at 8-9.
163 Llewellyn used this argument (willingness to accept a check indicates that the
offer can be accepted by promise) to exclude insurance contracts from the realm of
the classical unilateral. See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 814.
164 273 Md. at 606, 332 A.2d at 9 (quoting Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md.
App. 611, 625, 318 A.2d 874, 883 (1974)). A similar argument was made in Gillispie v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972), and in
Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979). The Giant Food and Barker
courts cited the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "termination" (Section
2-106(3)) to support their position:
"Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach or performance survives.
165 The point here is not that parties cannot form an enforceable contract if one party
can terminate at any time without obligation. Such an arrangement can result from a
true bargain. But the resulting contract is not bilateral because the party who can
terminate at will has not made a promise. See Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 649 (1982).
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It seems to me that both the customer's promise and the court's analysis are
illusory.
The most notable aspect of the few "tort" cases that discuss the unilateral
contract idea is that the courts adopt or reject the concept depending upon
whether its use facilitates or impedes a finding of liability. These cases
suggest contract theory's potential for expanding liability in personal injury
cases. 166 For example, when negligence is difficult to find, tort duties may
become implied promises. Moreover, holding a party to his promise might
seem more palatable than imposing something as onerous as "strict liability" upon him. Nor are courts limited to products liability and malpractice
cases if they wish to employ the language of contract. For example, a
taxpayer whose car is damaged by a pothole on a city street or a child
delivering newspapers who is hit by a falling icicle might recover on an
167
implied promise theory.
In many of these cases the "implied promise" is a fiction. The purported
promisor did not intend to make a promise, and the purported promisee did
not take the action which resulted in his injury in reliance on a promise. In
such cases the promissory theory allows the court to avoid confronting the
real source of its desire to impose civil obligation on the personal injury
defendant. 68 In Sims, for example, the question of the board of education's
obligation to compensate for injuries should not depend upon whether the
spectators in the bleachers paid for a ticket to sit there. 1 69 If courts are
dissatisfied with the results dictated by immunity doctrine, they should be
candid about their efforts to limit the doctrine. As the exploding-soda-bottle
cases demonstrate so well, the concept of implied promise can be used as a
rationalization to justify almost any finding of liability that a court wants to
make..

See, e.g., Carter v. Calhoun County Bd. of Educ., 345 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1977)
(School lunchroom worker, injured by a fall on the lunchroom floor, sued to recover
for breach of her employer's implied promise to provide "a reasonably safe place in
which to work."); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 342 So. 2d 321 (Ala. 1976) (Public
zoo patron, injured by stepping into a hole in the zoo walkway, recovered for the
city's breach of an implied contract to maintain the premises in a "reasonably safe
condition.").
167 Courts generally do not need to characterize this type of implied contract as
unilateral to find liability, although the unilateral idea makes it sufficient to infer only
one promise, rather than two.
168 See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 814-16 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). But see Shanker,
166

Reexamination of Prosser's Game, 29

CASE
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550 (1979).

Similarly, the grocer's liability for injuries caused by an exploding soda bottle
should not depend upon whether the injured party had formed a contract to purchase
that bottle.
169
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Public Policy Limitations

The previous section suggested that considerations of public policy sometimes impel judges to find implied promises despite the absence of words or
actions that could be reasonably understood as manifesting an intention to
induce expectations and reliance. Public policy concerns can push in the
other direction as well, causing judges to deny the existence of implied
promises (or to refuse enforcement of promises without denying their exist170
ence). Cases involving contractual claims by students against schools
provide a good example.
In Blatt v. University of Southern California,171 a former law student
employed a unilateral contract theory in an action seeking to compel his
admission into a national honorary legal society. He alleged that the defendants 7 2 represented to him that if he graduated in the top ten percent of his
class he would be eligible for membership in the honor society. He further
alleged that he ranked in the top ten percent of his class, but was refused
membership because of his failure to work on the school's Law Review, a
requirement which the plaintiff alleged was never mentioned to him.' 73 The
court held that the complaint did not present a justiciable issue: "We hold
that in the absence of allegations of sufficient facts of arbitrary or discriminatory action, membership in the Order is an honor best determined by those in
the academic field without judicial interference." 174 Although the court went
on to discuss and reject the plaintiff's unilateral contract and promissory
estoppel arguments on narrower grounds, the most significant aspect of the
decision is the deference the court accorded the academic decisionmaking
process. 175
Solicitude for the policies and decisions of academia continues to play an
important role in the judicial disposition of claims brought by students
against schools. 176 The general trend in the school cases, however, is toward
See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970).
172 Defendants were the university, the national honor society, the local chapter of
the society, and members of the committee of the local chapter who had the authority
to elect members from graduating students. Id. at 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
173 Id. at 938-39, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
174 Id. at 942, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
175 The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78 (1978), reaffirmed the notion of judicial deference to academia. The majority
opinion, however, drew a distinction between a school's academic decisions and its
disciplinary actions. According to the Court, the due process requirements for
academic dismissals are "far less stringent" than those for disciplinary dismissals.
id. at 86.
176 See, -e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Paulsen v.
Golden Gate Univ., 25 Cal. 3d 803, 602 P.2d 778, 159 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1979); Militana
v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
Courts are deferential to academic institutions even when they act as employers. In
170

171
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less deference-toward more public control of the actions of private
schools. 177 It seems safe to assume that the increased invocation of contract
law in this area results primarily from changing views about the studentschool relationship and not from increased promise-making activity by
schools.
The citizen-government cases 78 evidence a similar trend toward increased contractual analysis of relationships previously thought to be outside the realm of contract law. Although it certainly can be argued that in the
last half-century government has been making more promises and creating
more expectations, 179 the primary explanation for increased judicial intervention lies in social, intellectual, and political developments and not in the
"promise principle."' 80 As indicated earlier in this Article,' 8' judges continue to be cautious in their expansion of contract analysis in governmentcitizen cases because of concerns about the political and financial consequences of locking governments into long-term commitments, not because
of the inability to create plausible implied-promise arguments.

Drans v. Providence College, 119 R.I. 845, 383 A.2d 1033 (1978) and 410 A.2d 992
(R.I. 1980), a former professor sued for a declaratory judgment that he was not
subject to mandatory retirement at age 65 under a policy established by Providence
College. He argued that the retirement policy did not apply to him because he had
secured tenure at a time when there was no mandatory retirement age; the college
could not reduce his employment rights by establishing a new policy. 119 R.I. at 851,
383 A.2d at 1037. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island explained its remand of the
Drans case to the trial court as follows:
Our remand was for the specific purpose of a trial justice's considering evidence
that would indicate whether those who perform their pedagogical and administrative chores within the national academic community believe that Providence
College was obligated to make a special transition provision for Professor Drans
and, if so, whether the benefits furnished to him have met this obligation.
410 A.2d at 994. In other words, the trial court's function is not to make its own
assessment of the reasonableness of the change in policy as it related to Drans, but
rather to determine what the assessment of the "national academic community"
would be. The result is a greater degree of deference to academic institutions than to
most other private employers, at least with regard to academic personnel.
177 See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr.
499 (1972); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 II1.2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634
(1977); DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences, 40 Ill. App. 3d 474, 352 N.E.2d
356 (1976). See generally Ray, supra note 101; Note, supra note 101.
178 See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
179 Charles Reich argued that the vast increase in dependence on government
"largess" should lead us to a new concept of property. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The same argument could be made for the creation of a
"new contract" as a means of protecting the new property.
180 This is a major theme of Patrick Atiyah's monumental study of English contract law, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979).
'8' See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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. These relational 8 2 cases, then, seem to support those who argue that
contract is becoming indistinguishable from tort183 because in modern contract cases, as in tort cases, the existence and extent of obligation is being
determined primarily by social and political factors and not by the promise
principle. 184 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that because the
idea of the self-created obligation is insufficient to explain the results of the
cases it is irrelevant. Most of the modern unilateral contract cases involve
some combination of promissory and non-promissory sources of obligation. 185
The unilateral contract idea provides a bridge between contract and tort.
Although unilateral contract analysis begins by identifying a promise of the
defendant, enforcement of a unilateral contract need never be based solely
on the existence of a promise. Because, by definition, acceptance is by
performance (or tender or beginning of performance), a unilateral contract is
never totally executory; it cannot be formed without some benefit to the
promisor or some detriment to the promisee. 18 6 Furthermore, unilateral
contract, like tort, involves a relationship in which only one of the parties
182 The modern unilateral contracts described in this Article generally involve
continuing relationships rather than discrete transactions. This distinction and its
implications for contract law have been explored most fully by Ian Macneil. See,
e.g., Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
183 Charles Fried identifies Patrick Atiyah, Lawrence Friedman, Grant Gilmore,
Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Anthony Kronman, and Ian Macneil as critics
who "den[y] the coherence or the independent viability of the promise principle." C.
FRIED, supra note 117, at 2-3 & n.7.
184 A colleague has suggested that perhaps the existence of the legal obligation is
determined to a considerable extent by social factors, but the content of the obligation is determined by the defendant's own actions. Although this suggestion may
describe properly some situations, the distinction can work the other way as well.
Forty years ago Max Radin observed that "the modern marital relationship" is one in
which the obligation is self-created but the content of the obligation is fixed by
external sources. Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 575, 578 (1943).
185 It is important to recognize that promissory and non-promissory sources of
obligation build on each other. Fried argues: "There is reliance because a promise is
binding, and not the other way around." C. FRIED, supra note 117, at 19. The
contract-as-tort theorists, see supra note 183, would argue that a promise is binding
because there is reliance. But both sides would probably acknowledge that there is at
least some truth in both statements; the difference is only one of emphasis.
186 The offeree of a unilateral contract must at least tender or begin performance to
create legal obligations of the offeror. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981). Part performance will usually, although not always, constitute a
benefit to the offeror. In any event, part performance will be reliance by the offeree,
although in those cases where the performance is simply continuing the status quo,
see supra note 114 and accompanying text, the reliance may be more theoretical than
real.
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has any legally enforceable obligation. It should not be surprising, therefore,
that as contract becomes more like tort, unilateral contract becomes more
important.
Unilateral contract analysis allows courts to recognize the promissory
basis of obligation without the restriction of a necessary return promise. But
most modern unilateral contract cases require a balancing of public and
private interests that cannot be accomplished if the only question posed is
whether or not the defendant made a promise. All that we can hope for from
judges is an explicit recognition of both the privately-created and the
socially-imposed justifications for imposing (or denying) liability and a candid articulation of the relative roles of each in the decisionmaking process.
D.

The Choice Between UnilateralContract and Promissory Estoppel

The doctrine of promissory estoppe1 87 provides an alternative to unilateral contract 88 in cases that stand astride contract and tort. Promissory
estoppel, like unilateral contract, establishes a promissory basis of obligation without requiring a return promise. The promissory estoppel approach
has some important advantages over unilateral contract analysis. Its formulation in the Second Restatement of Contracts specifically recognizes the
need for courts to go beyond the promise principle by making the promise
189
binding "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
The doctrine thus encourages courts, as unilateral contract does not, to
address specifically the non-promissory determinants of liability-exactly
the position urged in the preceding section. 190 In addition, promissory estoppel protects reasonable reliance that cannot be characterized as "part
performance"; unilateral contract theory works only for plaintiffs who can
argue successfully that they have begun performance. Promissory estoppel
analysis avoids the unsatisfactory distinction between "beginning to perform" and "preparing to perform" which haunts unilateral contract
theory.191
There is no doubt that lawyers and judges are invoking the promissory
estoppel idea with increasing frequency in modern litigation. 192 Yet in the
Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, entitled "Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance," sets out the principle of promissory
estoppel:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
188 See generally Murray, supra note 3, at 805-06; Navin, supra note 43; Comment,
supra note 3, at 187-89.
189 See supra note 187.
190 See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
191 See Comment, supra note 3, at 188.
187

192 See generally Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doc-
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areas discussed in Part III of this Article, and particularly in the employment
benefits area, judges continue to prefer unilateral contract to promissory
estoppel. 193 One reason for this preference is that unilateral contract appears
to have the virtue of a long tradition, 194 and judges generally want to justify
their decisions in the most traditional way possible. 195 More importantly,
judges tend to choose unilateral contract over promissory estoppel when
they view the relationship (between employer and employee, for example)
as fundamentally one of exchange. The employer is getting something from
his employees in exchange for offered benefits; there is little or no reliance
by the employees which does not benefit the employer.
The key question is the role of reliance in establishing a right to recovery.
Consider again cases like Dangott 19 6 in which an employer establishes a
benefit plan for a group of its employees. Plaintiff is an employee who meets
all the eligibility requirements for the benefit but is unable to prove any
reliance on the existence of that benefit. Promissory estoppel, which specifically makes proof of reliance necessary to recovery, 197 might result in the
denial of the plaintiff's claim. It would be possible for judges to find an
employee's "general reliance" on the fact that whatever benefit policies do
exist will be fairly applied to him. Alternatively, courts could invoke the
concept of "market reliance"; the existence of a benefit policy means that
the employer is paying lower wages, and therefore the employee who accepts the lower wages has suffered detrimental reliance. 198 But it would be
trine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981).
193

But see, e.g., Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.

1980); Oates v. Teamster Affiliates Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp. 481 (D.D.C. 1979);

Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
194 Judges might recall being told that in English law unilateral contracts were the
first judicially-enforced agreements. These early unilateral contracts were not enforced unless and until the plaintiff completed performance; they fit into the category
of "half-executed" contracts. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 180, ch. 6 & 441-43;
J. DAWSON & W.B. i-iARVEY, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 361 (3d ed. 1977);
1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 13, at 19.
195 See generally Atiyah, Judges and Policy, 15 ISRAEL L. REV. 346 (1980).
196 Dangott v. ASG Indus., Inc., 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 131-42.
197 See supra note 187. It has been argued that it is particularly appropriate to look
to reliance as both the source and measure of liability when only one party makes a
promise. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 187-89; Note, Acceptance of Unclear
Offers, 60 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049 (1951).
198 Some courts have advanced a similar argument to meet the reliance requirement for private actions under SEC rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Note, The Fraud-on-theMarket Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
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hard to meet the requirement of promissory estoppel that the promise of the
benefit actually induce action or forbearance by the individual claimant. 99
There are two reasons for granting recovery in such cases, even without
proof of reliance. The first reason is a practical one; it is simply too hard to
determine the existence and extent of actual reliance. We do not want
employees on the stand testifying about how carefully they read the terms of
their employer's benefit plans and about how much they relied on particular
terms. This pragmatic problem becomes even more difficult if we look to
reliance not only as the source of obligation but also as the measure of
obligation.20 0 The second reason for eliminating the reliance requirement in
these cases is that all employees who meet the eligibility requirements
established by the employer should be treated equally, regardless of the
extent of their actual reliance.20 1 This argument also has a practical side;
treating similarly situated employees unequally can lead to resentment and
dissension among employees. Ultimately, however, the justification rests on
political and moral grounds. Defenders of the promise principle would say
that at bottom it is right that these employees be treated equally because the
employer made a commitment that they would be treated equally. Others
would argue that the ultimate basis is not the action of the employer but a
community judgment that it would be wrong to distinguish among these
employees on the basis of individual reliance even if the employer tried to do
so in making the original promise. The choice between these arguments
depends not only on one's belief about what contract law should be but also
on one's convictions about what kind of society we should have.
'99 See RESTATEMENT

187.

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §

90 (1981), quoted supra note

200 The difficulty of measuring reliance damages is a frequently cited reason for
resorting to expectation damages. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 787-98;
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 60-62.
201 But see Westen, The Empty Idea o f Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
Professor Westen argues that the concept of equality cannot itself justify rights; one
must look first to other criteria to establish who qualifies to be placed in the group
that gets equal treatment. In our context, the equality argument could be used to
deny recovery to those who have not actually relied on the employer's promise
("They are not equal because they did not rely.") or to grant recovery to employees
in identical jobs with different employers ("They are equal because they did the same
work."). The concept of equality alone cannot fully explain the results of the cases.
As Westen realizes, however, changing the statement from one of equality ("All
workers who meet the eligibility requirements for an employment benefit should be
treated equally without regard to individual reliance.") to one of rights ("Workers
have a right not to be denied benefits for which they are otherwise eligible because
they cannot prove reliance.") does not add any explanatory power. "Rights," like
"equality," is an empty word. Westen, On "Confusing Ideas": Reply, 91 YALE L.J.
1153 (1982). Westen's argument is that "equality" is confusing in a way that "rights"
is not, because "equality" "tends to mask the substantive normative standards it
incorporates by reference ... .- Id. at 1165.
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CONCLUSION

The theory of the unilateral contract rests on two factual findings: 1) one
party made a promise; and 2) the other party did not. This Article considered
the second requirement first. Karl Llewellyn and the drafters of the Second
Restatement of Contracts believed that there were very few contracts that
did not involve promises by both parties. Their approach was to infer the
offeree's promise and make the contract bilateral. An examination of American case law since the promulgation of the first tentative draft of the Second
Restatement in 1964 reveals, however, that judges have not abandoned their
use of unilateral contract theory in favor of a bilateral contract approach. On
the contrary, not only have they continued to invoke the unilateral contract
idea in traditional areas, but they have expanded its use into new areas.
Courts generally have acted appropriately in recognizing the one-way
nature of many modern contractual obligations. The concept of one-party
obligation is often particularly appropriate in analyzing relationships between individuals and large organizations. Although Llewellyn's criticism of
unilateral contract was persuasive for the time and context in which it was
written, modern judges need not be reluctant to use unilateral contract
theory when they think it appropriate in defining exchange relationships in
the modern corporate state.
The first requirement (that the defendant made a promise) presents more
difficult questions in determining whether unilateral contract theory is appropriate in a particular case. In the modern cases judges generally use
unilateral contract to impose liability. They begin by finding an implied
promise by the defendant and then justify enforcement of that promise solely
by invoking the unilateral contract idea. The unilateral contract rubric often
allows judges to avoid disclosing their true motivations in finding implied
promises and in deciding to enforce them. In most situations, and particularly in contexts in which courts are expanding the scope of obligation into
new areas, there are both promissory and non-promissory reasons for imposing liability. Recognition and articulation of each might lead to betterreasoned and more consistent decisions.
The history of the unilateral-bilateral distinction records a movement
toward increased contractual obligation. We are told that unilaterals were
the first judicially-enforced contracts. 20 2 Later, courts accepted the idea that
giving a return promise justified enforcement of the first promise. Bilateral
contract became the paradigm for the development of contract law. With the
bilateral model in mind, some courts employed language to the effect that
"unless both parties are bound, neither is bound." Application of this
"mutuality of obligation" test to the traditional unilateral contract situation
led to unacceptable denials of liability. Scholars and judges articulated the
unilateral-bilateral distinction in part to respond to this problem. 20 3 They
202 See supra note 194.
203 1 A. CORBIN, supra

§ 13, at 19-20.

note 6, § 21, at 52-53; see 1 S.

WILLISTON, supra note

7,

19831

MODERN UNILATERAL CONTRACTS

argued that the mutuality of obligation idea applied, if at all, 20 4 only to
bilaterals; promisors who made promises contingent upon performance of
certain actions by promisees should be held to their promises after the
offeree's performance even though the promisee had no obligation to perform.
Courts, however, often refused to enforce promises for promisees who
had not completed performance prior to the promisor's revocation of the
promise. The theory was that the promisee could accept only by complete
performance, and that the promisor-offeror could revoke at any time before
acceptance. 20 5 Against this background, Llewellyn and other commentators
attempted to reduce the number of unilateral contracts by making them
bilateral. They urged the bilateral model primarily to deal with the revocation problem-to create more liability of the offeror-although they also
sought to impose a promissory obligation on the original promisee.
Courts today often seek to impose liability on offerors in situations where
it would be difficult or undesirable to infer a promise by the offeree. In these
situations the unilateral contract idea is used to justify still more liability for
offerors. At the same time, courts have been placing restrictions on the right
of offerors to revoke their offers without liability. Now the beginning of
performance (or even the tender of the beginning of performance) is usually
enough to prevent effective revocation. 20 6 Throughout this century the path
has been toward increased enforceability of promises, express or implied,
that have been followed by some action on the part of the promisee. 20 7 The
unilateral contract has been one tool used to clear this path.
There is a double irony in the course of events that has followed Llewellyn's criticism of the unilateral-bilateral distinction. Llewellyn criticized the
distinction as primarily an academic construction that accorded much more
significance to the unilateral contract than could be supported by an exam-

204

See the debate between Oliphant and Williston over the usefulness of the

mutuality of obligation idea: Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in BilateralContracts
at Law, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 705 (1925), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 997 (1928); Williston,
The Effect of One Void Promise in a BilateralAgreement, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 857

(1925).
205 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981).
The increased use of unilateral contract theory to enforce promises followed by
full or partial performance by the promisee suggested in this Article is consistent with
Professor Atiyah's general observations about trends in English contract law. See P.
ATIYAH, supra note 180, at 713-14, 759. Atiyah argues that "[t]he past hundred years
have witnessed a resurgence of reliance-based liabilities, as well as of benefit-based
liabilities." Id. at 771. The expansion of promissory estoppel and unilateral contract
theory suggests a similar, although perhaps more recent, resurgence in this country.
Atiyah also argues that there has been a related decline in enforceability of wholly
executory bilateral agreements; that argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
206
207

See

596
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ination of the cases. 20 8 Now it is academics who are trying to minimize the
importance of the unilateral contract in the Second Restatement, and judges
who are expanding the use of the idea. It is not that courts simply are slow to
adopt new theory. Courts have found the unilateral contract concept useful
in areas not contemplated by Llewellyn. The deeper irony is that the unilateral contract-a concept perceived by Llewellyn as an obstacle to expanding
the scope of promissory obligation-has become an effective tool for achieving that end.
208 See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 36.

